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Abstract 
This investigative research consists of two papers that are both con-
cerned with unconventional market demands. Economists like Katz 
and Spiegel (1996) and Corneo and Jeanne (1997) investigate uncon-
ventional market demands by intergroup externalities and signalling 
values respectively. The central theme of this research is to use their 
approaches: 1) to prove the reverse of Katz and Spiegel (1996); 2) to 
extend Corneo and Jeanne (1997)，s model. 
Paper 1: Our investigation is based on Katz and Spiegel (1996)'s 
work. Katz and Spiegel (1996) derive market demand from individual 
demands with intergroup externalities and provide specific examples, 
that even individual demands are negatively dependent on prices, with 
intergroup externalities these individual demands can generate an up-
ward sloping market demand function. Our paper proves the reverse 
and generally shows that all piecewise linear market demand functions 
can be derived from downward sloping piecewise linear individual de-
mand functions with the hypothesis of intergroup externalities. 
Paper 2: Corneo and Jeanne (1997) study the market demand of 
one conspicuous signalling good. Our paper extends their work by 
considering a general situation with multiple (rather than one) con-
spicuous commodities. Assuming one conspicuous good, they show 
that its demand function can be upward sloping. In our paper, new 
equilibrium concepts for the case of two conspicuous goods are de-
veloped and necessary conditions to find the equilibrium solution for 
demands are provided. The price effects on demands are also stud-
ied. Our result shows that with conformist consumer behavior, some 
cases always give rise to a downward sloping demand curve for one of 
the conspicuous goods. With snobbish consumer behavior, some cases 




凱兹和斯皮蓋爾（1 9 9 6 )，克魯雷歐和約妮（1 9 9 7)就曾對這種非 
常規的市場需求作出深入的探討，他們分別以組群間的外部性及信號價値作 
爲前提。這份硏究的主題是運用他們的前提作以下兩方面的探討：1)證明 
凱兹和斯皮蓋爾（19 9 6)的反向也能成立；2)延伸克魯雷歐和約妮 
( 1 9 9 7 )的模型。 




( 1 9 9 6 )的反向也能成立。亦即是說，在組群間的外部性的作用下，我 
們普遍地證明所有具有分段線性特性的市場需求函數，也能被斜率爲負的 
且具有分段線性特性的個體需求所導出。 
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1 Introduction 
Under normal situations, classical theory with standard utility maximization 
generates a downward sloping individual demand function. ^ Horizontal 
summation of these downward sloping individual demand functions gives 
rise to a downward sloping market demand function. 
However, in the real world, we observe that upward sloping market de-
mand functions indeed exist. For example, in the automobile market, we 
observe that the demand of the automobile increases with its price. Bagwell 
and Bernheim (1996) are aware of the violation in the Law of Demand in the 
automobile market. Another example is the demand for diamond. An in-
crease in the price of diamond will lead to a higher demand, (c.f. Ng (1987).) 
Basil (1989) and Jaramillo, Kemf and Moizeau (2000) study the demand for 
club membership, which also increases with its price. 
A typical explanation for the violation of the Law of Demand is the 
Giffen good hypothesis. But economic theorists e.g. Hicks (1956), have 
noted that it is uncommon.2 Not using the hypothesis of income effect, we 
will explain upward sloping demand. We will follow two approaches that 
exist in the literature to explain the upward sloping demand: intergroup 
externalities and signalling values. The two approaches are different from 
classical hypothesis which states that agent maximizes his utility derived 
from his own consumption only. 3 We will discuss intergroup externalities in 
paper 1 and signalling values in paper 2. 
iQf course non-downward sloping demand function occurs when the good is a Giffen 
good, where income effect outweighs substitution effect. But Hicks (1956) shows that 
Giffen good is uncommon. 
^Lipsey and Rosenbluth (1971) argue that Giffen Good is not unlikely. They make a 
distinction between commodities and their characteristics. They assume that character-
istics cannot be inferior, utility of consumption depends on the characteristics and each 
commodity provides certain characteristics in fixed proportions. Other economists e.g. 
Wold and Jureen (1953) and Spiegel (1994) give a particular utility function that yields a 
Giffen Good to support their view that Giffen Good is not uncommon. Therefore, Giffen 
Good hypothesis is rather controversial. 
^Examples of classical hypothesis of consumer demand are Marshall (1890)'s demand, 
Hicks (1956)，s demand and Hildenbrand (1994)'s market demand. Hildenbrand (1994) 
propose that the Law of Demand is mainly due to the heterogeneity of the population of 
households. He based his arguments on two hypotheses: increasing dispersion and increas-
ing spread of households' demand. And his hypotheses are well supported by empirical 
evidence. 
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1.1 Literature review 
Existing literature offers different hypotheses of economic agent's motivation 
such as social status and consumption externality. These hypotheses are 
applied in the study of consumer demand and some other problems. Below, 
we will summarize these hypotheses and their applications. 
Social status 
In the real world, we may observe social status often interact with the 
decision of consumer's consumption pattern. Consumers may derive some 
utility from the increase in social status. 
Bernheim (1994) puts forth three reasons why status may enter the utility 
function. The first reason is that it is consistent with psychological evidence. 
Second, it is based on evolutionary concepts. Those who are highly regarded, 
have a greater opportunity to reproduce. Third, those who are highly re-
garded receive better treatment. Individuals with higher social status may 
be regarded as smarter, with greater ability, more power and some political 
influence. Therefore, they may derive utility directly from these positive per-
ceptions of them by members of the society or indirectly from some material 
or pecuniary gains arisen as a result of these perceptions. 
A number of economists have recognized the significance of social status 
on consumer behavior. More than a century ago, Patten (1889) and Ve-
blen (1899) criticize the consumption theory that does not take into account 
social and psychological influence. According to Veblen (1899), conspicuous 
consumption raises social status. There are two motives for conspicuous con-
sumption. One is the "invidious comparison". This is for a higher class mem-
ber to consume the conspicuous good to distinguish himself from those of a 
lower class. This is what we will call snobbish consumer behavior throughout 
our discussion. The other is the "pecuniary emulation". This is for a lower 
class member to consume the conspicuous good to mimic those of a higher 
class. This is what we will call conformist consumer behavior throughout. 
And Veblen effect is defined as the willingness to pay or the preference for a 
good increases with its price. 
In fact, the term "snob" is used by Leibenstein (1950) to describe indi-
viduals with strong individualistic values. They have a strong desire to show 
their idiosyncrasies to attain social prestige. Therefore, snob effect describes 
the decrease in preference for a good as the number of people buying it in-
creases. Leibenstein (1950) also use "bandwagon" to describe the behavior 
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of conformity. The phenomenon that people tend to follow the crowd. Band-
wagon effect describes the increase in preference for a good as the number 
of people buying it increases. One possible explanation for conformity is to 
avoid social ostracism. 
Basmann, Molina and Slottje (1988) do an empirical test on Veblen's 
theory of conspicuous consumption. Taking Veblen's theory that the con-
sumption of conspicuous good is to demonstrate the agents' income, they 
incorporate prices and total expenditure into the direct utility function, be-
sides the usual quantities of commodities. Their empirical test results on 
durables are consistent with Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption. 
However, Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) challenge the use of prices directly 
to study Veblen's theory. 
Expensive wine, cosmetics, sport cars and diamonds are examples of 
goods that are highly visible and are usually the target of status seeking. 
Chao and Schor (1998) provide empirical evidence to support the association 
of status seeking with the purchase of cosmetics. 
Social status on consumer demand 
Duesenberry (1949) states that social rather than purely economic consid-
erations often determined the nature and pattern of consumer's consumption 
pattern. He defines a particular category of goods as "superior good" and 
the consumption of superior good is for "demonstration effect". Therefore, 
he argues that an increase in consumption expenditure may be independent 
of price or income. It is social influence that is operating behind. 
Bernheim (1994) finds that if status is sufficiently important relative to 
intrinsic utility, then most individuals with heterogeneous preferences will 
conform to a standard behavior, which can be the level of consumption or 
other social actions. 
Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) argue that in order to follow strictly Ve-
blen's concept of conspicuous consumption, utility should be defined over 
consumption and status, rather than over consumption and prices. They 
propose the use of signalling of prices on status to derive equilibrium con-
ditions. However, they do not think that paying a high price is the only 
way to signal wealth. They incorporate both quantities and qualities into 
their model to signal wealth. Their result shows that Veblen effect exists if 
personal bankruptcy is allowed. 
Corneo and Jeanne (1997) also study the consumption of conspicuous 
goods by signalling values. They study demand under two kinds of con-
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sumer behaviors for conspicuous goods: snobbish and conformist. They show 
that the demand function of conspicuous good can be upward sloping under 
conformist consumer behavior. 
Ng (1993) studies mixed diamond goods, which has some intrinsic utility. 
He shows that demand curves for mixed diamond goods with no inferiority 
may be upward-sloping. 
Social status on other problems 
Akerlof (1980) applies the social status hypothesis to study unemploy-
ment and explain why social custom can persist in the long run. He proves 
that if the cost of breaking the custom is high enough, then there can be a 
long run discrimination equilibrium. 
Fershtman and Weiss (1998) define socially minded individuals to be those 
who care about what other people think about them. They study the effect 
of investment in schooling and the option of immigration on social status. 
Fershtman and Weiss (1993) also combine the idea of social status from 
sociology with economics to study wage differential, aggregate output and 
economic performance of a country. 
Rauscher (1993) studies the dynamics of status-seeking behavior. Status 
seeking is a zero sum game. An improvement of status on one person is asso-
ciated with a worsening of status on at least one other person. He concludes 
that there are two opposing forces. One is to drive people to seek status 
harder while the other is to discourage people out of the game. 
Ng (1987) shows that for some classes of goods, like diamonds, which 
are valued for their high prices but not their intrinsic values, a lump sum 
tax will not add excess burden on the consumers. It is because with a tax 
introduced, it is like raising the price of the good. The consumers are paying 
exactly the same amount of money, but only receiving a smaller quantities. 
However, since the good has no intrinsic value, as long as they pay the same 
high price for the good. Their utility will not change. Thus there will be no 
excess burden. The utility function, he uses to derive the results, depends 
on the quantities of all the inconspicuous goods, and the real expenditure 
on the conspicuous good. So, he suggests that governments can raise a very-
high tax on diamond-kind of goods. 
Intergroup externality 
The utility of consuming a good can be affected by the consumption 
choice of other consumers. Intergroup externality affects consumer's demand 
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and hence the aggregate market demand. 
The demand of certain goods, for example, the use of ICQ and online 
games offered by mobile telephones with bluetooth, depends on the total 
number of people who use it. Nobody will use it except he believes that a 
large number of other people will also use it. Thus the sale of the product will 
be successful only if it exceeds a critical mass of consumers. This is network 
effect and it is divided into direct network effect and indirect network effect. 
For the indirect network effect, the changes in the number of consumers affect 
the price of the product, and thus it affect the utility of the agent through the 
price changes. For the direct network effect, it is the number of consumers 
that directly affect the demand of the product of the agent. 
An example of externality happens in the market of daily newspapers. 
George and Waldfogel (2003) study the newspaper market of the U.S.. They 
find that the tendency for blacks to purchase a daily paper increases with 
the number of blacks in the market but decreases with the number of whites. 
The tendency for whites to purchase a newspaper increases in the number of 
whites and is unaffected by the number of Blacks. In another paper, George 
and Waldfogel (2000) find that the Blacks and the Whites fail to benefit or 
even hurt each other between the groups. But, within the Whites, or within 
the Blacks, who share similar preferences, they will confer positive pecuniary 
preference externalities on each other. 
Bearden and Rose (1990) conduct an experiment to study the interper-
sonal influence on consumer behavior. According to High Attention to Social 
Comparison Information (AT-SCI) used by psychologists, they divide agents 
into three groups: high AT-SCI, low AT-SCI and no social pressure. They 
find that people with high AT-SCI are more likely to conform to the nor-
mative consumer behavior. Their results therefore suggest that consumer 
behavior is affected by social forces. 
Intergroup externality on consumer demand 
Katz and Spiegel (1996) apply the intergroup externality hypothesis to 
study upward sloping market demand. They show that two downward sloping 
groups' demands can generate an upward sloping market demand with the 
presence of intergroup externality. 
Becker (1991) observes that restaurants offering similar food and service, 
one may in excess demand while the other in excess capacity. He incorporates 
the number of consumers into the demand function to explain the restaurant 
phenomenon. He justifies his approach by the following three reasons. The 
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first is that the consumption is usually associated with social activities. The 
consumption may be part of a social activities such as dining out in the 
restaurant, attending a concert. The second is that people do not want to 
be out of step with what is popular. The third is that people may have 
more confidence in the quality of those goods which are more popular. He 
even suggests that it may be the "gap"- the excess demand over supply, that 
affects the demand function apart from the number of consumers. 
Kami and Levin (1994) extend Becker (1991). They provide a micro-
foundation and game theoretical approach to explain why for two given 
restaurants, one has excess demand, while the other has excess capacity. 
With consumption externality, they also derive upward sloping demand curves. 
Yeung (2002) also studies consumption externalities on individual's de-
mand curve. He focuses on elasticity of demand. He shows that upward 
sloping demand curve exists for certain elasticity of demand. 
Katz and Shapiro (1994) study systems competition and network effect. 
They suggest that many products can be thought of being composed of hard-
ware and software. Hardware and software together form a system. And 
there is competition between systems. They find that due to network exter-
nalities, the demand for the system is below the socially optimal level. 
Intergroup externality on other problems 
Katz and Shapiro (1994) also investigate network effect on innovation. 
They argue that network effects will not retard innovation and new sponsored 
technology can replace old ones. 
Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001) combine the consumption externality model 
and the spatial duopoly model to investigate firms' strategic pricing behavior 
under different social attitudes. They find that under vanity, price competi-
tion is relaxed. However, when conformity is strong, there is a multiplicity 
of equilibrium in prices and in most of these equilibria, a single firm captures 
the whole market. When there is a weak conformity, there is a fierce price 
competition between the firms. 
Club membership, which is a special kind of association goods, is valuable 
when others are joining the club. Therefore, club membership is a special 
kind of consumption externality. 
Jaramillo, Kempf and Moizeau (2000) study club membership. They 
mingle club membership with signalling value and conspicuous goods. Their 
agents spend on conspicuous goods in order to provide signals to enter a 
club. By entering the club, they can gain social status and enjoy the club 
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good. The authors find that the agents may be induced to overspend in the 
conspicuous good. Their paper is a mix of both social status and consumption 
externality. 
Basil (1989) also study club membership. The results are unconventional. 
In equilibrium, demand and supply may not equal and the use of price mech-
anism could diminish its value. 
Fads can be thought of as a kind of externality. Since the value of fad to 
one person depends on the number of others who also participate. Otherwise 
fads cannot be established. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), 
(1998) study fads and customs. 
1.2 Summary of our results 
After reviewing these two possible approaches existing in the literature, we 
will explain the violation of the Law of Demand by them. 
Summary of paper 1 
Katz and Spiegel (1996) use individual demands, which are negative in 
price, to derive a market demand function. They add group externalities to 
the individual demands. Then by summation of individual demands, they 
derive a market demand which is not necessarily downward sloping. 
Our paper follows their framework, but we tackle the problem in the other 
direction. More precisely, we show that all market demand functions can be 
derived by individual demands with negative intergroup externalities. 
As shown in our Theorem 1: 
We consider any given piecewise linear market demand func-
tions. We prove that even the market demand function is not 
necessarily downward sloping, it can always be rationalized by 
individual downward sloping demand functions with the presence 
of intergroup externalities. 
Katz and Spiegel (1996) only give specific examples where individual de-
mands are downward sloping, but market demand is upward sloping. 
They fail to explain all market demand functions by intergroup external-
ities. 
Our contribution is this. We show that all market demand curves can be 
rationalized by downward sloping group demands with negative intergroup 
externalities. 
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Our implication is this. Empirically, without intergroup externalities, a 
test on the negative price effect on demand can be distinguished. It is because 
market demand is the summation of individual demands. So, when market 
demand violates the law of demand, then the individual demands cannot be 
all downward sloping. 
However, with intergroup externalities, the individual demands can be 
downward sloping while market demand is upward sloping. The result is that 
negative price effect is empirically not testable. Therefore, from empirical 
data, we cannot refute the hypothesis of negative price effect on individual 
quantity demand. 
We justify our restriction to the class of piecewise linear demands. In 
the real world, when we do empirical tests, there are only finitely many 
observations. The plotting of these finitely many observations will generate 
piecewise linear demands. So, from the practical point of view, piecewise 
linear demands are important and can be justified. 
Summary of paper 2 
Corneo and Jeanne (1997) consider the demand of one conspicuous good. 
What is a conspicuous good? It is a good which consumers derive no in-
trinsic utility but the consumption of this good is socially observable. Thus 
consumers derive utility from conspicuous good only through the perception 
of higher wealth or income by others in the society, which is the rank utility. 
Here we assume that being perceived with higher wealth or income adds to 
one's utility. ^ In other words, the consumption of conspicuous goods acts as 
a signalling process to derive higher rank utility. Income is private informa-
tion. Others infer the consumer's income level by observing his consumption 
of the conspicuous good. 
There are two kinds of consumption hypotheses in Corneo and Jeanne 
(1997). They are the snobbish consumer behavior and the conformist con-
sumer behavior. For the snobbish one, the rank utility decreases when others 
are purchasing the good because expected level of income decreases. For the 
conformist one, the rank utility increases when others are purchasing the 
good because expected level of income increases. And the demand for a con-
spicuous good depends on its price and its signalling value i.e. rank utility. 
There are two main results from Corneo and Jeanne (1997). Corneo and 
Jeanne (1997) prove that if the consumer behavior is snobbish, then the de-
^This idea has been used by many others, for example, Akerlof (1980), Bernheim (1994) 
and Rauscher (1993) etc. 
10 
mand of the conspicuous good is always downward sloping. If the demand 
function of the conspicuous good is upward sloping, then the consumer be-
havior is conformist. The converse is not necessarily true. 
Our work follows their framework but we extend their model to one with 
two conspicuous goods. 
Incorporating one more conspicuous good into the model makes it more 
realistic. With only one conspicuous good, Corneo and Jeanne (1997) fail 
to study the substitution effect across the two conspicuous goods. With two 
conspicuous goods, we can study the cross effect between the two conspicuous 
goods. We can also study the substitution effect on the inconspicuous good. 
Finally, we carry out welfare analysis. 
The contributions in extending the model to two conspicuous goods in-
clude: 
1. The equilibrium concepts in the model of two conspicuous goods are 
different. Therefore, we need to introduce new equilibrium concepts, 
(c.f. Equation (66).) 
2. The demands of the two conspicuous goods are simultaneously deter-
mined. (c.f. Equation (68).) 
3. We provide a necessary condition to find the equilibrium solution for 
demands, (c.f. Equations (67) and (68).) 
4. Given any signalling value, Corneo and Jeane (1997) can solve for a 
particular rank utility function. There are no empirical restrictions on 
the rank utility function in their model. However, in the model with 
two conspicuous goods, there is a strong empirical criterion and we 
provide a necessary and sufficient condition for it. (c.f. Theorem 3.) 
5. We analyse the price effect on demand. We extend their definitions 
of conformity and snobbism for our model of two conspicuous goods. 
We show that some cases follow their results, while some cases deviate 
from their results. So, we study the robustness of their conclusion with 
multiple goods, (c.f. Section 3.3.3.) 
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2 Intergroup externalities and market demand 
Abstract 
Katz and Spiegel (1996) derive market demand from individual de-
mands with intergroup externalities. They provide specific examples, 
that even individual demands are negatively dependent on prices, with 
intergroup externalities these individual demands can generate an up-
ward sloping market demand function. Our paper proves the reverse 
and generally shows that all piecewise linear market demand functions 
can be derived from downward sloping piecewise linear individual de-
mand functions with the hypothesis of intergroup externalities. 
2.1 Introduction 
According to the Law of Demand, it is well accepted that individual demand 
is negatively dependent on price. But market demand may not be negatively 
dependent on price. We attempt to explain this non-negatively sloped market 
demand. There are several different approaches existing in the literature to 
explain such market demands. For example, Lipsey and Rosenbluth (1971) 
use commodity characteristics to study the positively sloped demand. Katz 
and Shapiro (1994) study network effect on demand. Bernheim (1994) study 
social status on demand. 
Our approach is intergroup externality. This is nothing new. It has 
been used before by Katz and Spiegel (1996) to derive non-negatively sloped 
market demand and by Kami and Levin (1994) to study two restuarants' 
demands. Specifically, we follow Katz and Spiegel (1996). Katz and Spiegel 
(1996) derive market demand from individual demands with intergroup exter-
nalities. Katz and Spiegel (1996) only give specific examples where individual 
demands are downward sloping but market demand is upward sloping. They 
fail to explain all market demand functions by intergroup externalities. 
This paper will rationalize upward sloping demand functions by inter-
group externalities. Our result suggests that all piecewise linear market de-
mand functions can be rationalized by piecewise linear downward sloping 
individual demand functions with intergroup externalities. 
Prom the revealed preference view point, allowing negative intergroup 
externality imposes no restrictions on demand curves. Individuals still maxi-
mize their utilities under budget constraints with the presence of externality. 
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2.2 Results 
We begin by reviewing the model of Katz and Spiegel (1996). Katz and 
Spiegel (1996) divide consumers into two groups 1 and 2. When consum-
ing similar goods, they may impose externality upon one another. Their 
individual demands Xi and X2 are given by 
xi = a i - + (1) 
二 - "2户 + 72^1 
where 
1. parameters 71, 72 < 0 and a i , Q!2, Pi, "2 > 0. 
2. Xi and X2 are the total demand by group 1 and group 2 respectively. 
A term 飞Xj is added to the conventional demand function of each group 
member. captures the externality of group j on group i. 
Given any price P , the market quantity demanded is 
X = Nixi + N2X2 (2) 
where xi, X2 satisfy: 
二 m a x { 0 , Q ; i + 全2}’ 
X2 = max{0,0；2 — P2P + I2N1X1}. 
1 . a n d X2 are the actual amounts demanded by a member of group 1 
and group 2 respectively. 
2. Ni and N2 are the total number of consumers in group 1 and 2 respec-
tively. 
3. Condition (3) rules out the negative values of demands. 
Example: 
With the following individual demands: 
rci = 10 - P - 3X2 
X2 = A - P - O X i 
5Negative signs of 71’ 72 mean there are negative intergroup externalities. 
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Ni = N2 = 1, and the market demand can be derived and is like that in 
Figure 1. 
Price 
1 1 1——^ 1 1 1 1 1 Quantity demanded 
Figure 1: Market demand curve for two groups 
One of their main results is this: 
Proposition 1 (Katz Spiegel (1996), Theorem 1) Suppose 7i72A^iA^2 < 
1, then the market demand is not always downward sloping, and is upward 
sloping on some intervals of prices. 
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Proof of Proposition i;(Katz & Spiegel, p.516) 
Their market demand curve X is in the form of 
X = NiXi + N2X2. 
Substituting and rearranging, they have 
^ _ Niai + A^ 2Qi2 + •/ViiV2(7iQ 2^ + 720:1) 
— 1 - 7I72-/VIA 2^ � 
iViA + N2P2 + iViA^2(7i^2 + 72A) p ^ ) 
1 -卞卞N 1 N 2 . 
The conditions for an upward sloping market demand curve requires: 
slope of X in Equation (4) > 0 
iViA + N2P2 + NiN2{ii(32 + 7 2 A ) � Q 
1 - 7i72A I^A^2 
They assume Y — y m N 从 〉 0 钱 1112^1^2 < 1 
which implies 一{N从 + N2P2 + + I2P1)] > 0. Q.E.D. 
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Remark 1 Intuitively, Proposition 1 states that with intergroup externali-
ties, negative price effect on individuals is consistent with positive price effect 
on market demands. To explain the occurrence of the upward sloping market 
demand, let's consider a group, say Group 1, it derives direct consumption 
benefits and indirect utility from intergroup externalities from the consump-
tion of the good. If Group 2 consumes, this will lower the indirect utility of 
Group 1 derived from the good. Thus, according to the negative price effect 
on groups' demands, an increase in price decreases both groups' consump-
tion. However, at the same time, the indirect utility of Group 1 increases 
and the consumption of Group 1 increases. Thus, aggregate demand may 
increase, resulting in a positively sloped demand curve. 
Notice that Katz and Spiegel (1996) only give specific examples where 
individual demands are downward sloping, but market demand is upward 
sloping. In the following, we will show that we can do more. In particular, 
we will show that we can use intergroup externalities to explain all market 
demands. Formally, we ask the question: given any piecewise linear market 
demand, can we "rationalize" it by individual piecewise linear downward 
sloping demands? 
First we justify the use of piecewise linear demands. In the real world, 
when we do empirical tests, there are only finitely many observations. The 
plotting of these finitely many observations will generate piecewise linear 
demands. So, from the practical point of view, piecewise linear demands are 
important and can be justified. 
In this section, we will find the unobserved individual demand curves 
from the given market demand curve. With the given parameters of the 
individuals' demands, we can construct the market demand curve. Given the 
graphical market demand curve, we show that we can find those parameters 
of the individuals' demands. Then, we generalize the model to find the 
individuals' demand curves for n groups. 
In the rest, we say a function X(-), for both market demand and individ-
ual demand, is piecewise linear if 
X : E+ M+ is continuous such that 3n < oo, po > • • • > Pn+i 
X(p) = 0 for all p>pq 
X(-) is linear on each interval for z = 0, • • • ,n 
X(p) > 0 for all p < Po-
le 
We define be the derivative of X{p) with respect to any p in 
the interval (热,负+i). 
On the interval (oo,饰)，the derivative V X with respect to p is constant, 
and is equal to zero. So, we have VX|(oo,po) = 0. Similarly, V X is constant on 
each interval (热，热+1)，i.e. for any p, p' e (负’热+1)，the derivative VX{p)= 
• 糊 . 
We say has (n + 1) kinked points if VX|(cx,,po) + V^k如’灼）and 
•^(p-‘,p�+i) + •X|(p-m’p-i+2) for all i = 0 , . . . ’n — 1. 
We say X{-) is downward sloping if < 0 for a lH = 0, • • • , n. 
Remark 2 
1. Note in (PL), we assume X{p) < CXD at p = 0. 
2. The property that X{p) > 0 can be justified. In reality, it is rare 
to observe the demands of some goods to be negative or zero at a 
particular price range while there is positive demand above and below 
that price range. 
3. The given market demands need not be downward sloping, but the 
individual demands obtained will be downward sloping. 
4. For simplicity of our proof, we make the special assumption on the 
market demands: (Alternating sign) 
• X b � ’ / h ) < 0’ ••^ l(p-i，p-2) > 0 , … ， < 0. (AS) 
Definition 1 A market demand function X{P) satisfying (PL) is rational-
izable, if there exists individual demand functions ^i(P), • • • ,gn{P) satisfying 
(PL) and are downward sloping such that for all P: 
Xi 二 gi(P) + 712X2 + . • • + 7lnXn 
； ； (5) 
Xn = gn(P) + Tnl^l H 1" 7n,n-l^n-l 
and the market quantity demanded 
X{P) = f 1 + f 2 + • • • + ^n (6) 
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where 
Xi = max{0, gi{P) + 712^2 H 1- 7in^n} 
： ： (7) 
Xn = max{0, gn{P) + 7nl^l H ^ 7n’n-l全n-l}. 
Then we also say that xi,- • • ,Xn form a rationalization for X{p). 
Remark 3 
1. Downward sloping individual demands ^i(P), • • • , gn{P) means that 
the price effect on demand is negative for all the g functions. 
2. .Prom (5), we have 712 •• • 7n,n-i, they are negative intergroup external-
ities. 
3. Prom (6), market quantity demanded is the summation of all individ-
uals X. 
4. Prom (7), it guarantees non-negativity of individual demands. 
The following is our main result: 
Theorem 1 Any piecewise linear (see (PL)) market demand functions sat-
isfying (AS) can be rationalized by downward sloping individual demand func-
tions^ with intergroup externalities. 
Proof: See Section 2.3. 
With intergroup externalities, the individual demands can be downward 
sloping while market demand is upward sloping. And the negative price 
effect is empirically not testable. So, the hypothesis of negative price effect 
on individual demands cannot be refuted. 
Remark 4 
1. Our result is not the unique rationalization. 
6We never claim the uniqueness of these rationalizations. Indeed, one market demand 
functions have many possible rationalizations, as shown in our proof. 
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2. Our proof only deals with negative externality. It fails for positive 
externality. 
3. (AS) assumption can be relaxed and the same ideas can be used with 
some modifications. 
Thus, we obtain: 
Theorem 2 Relaxing (AS) assumption, any piecewise linear (see (PL)) mar-
ket demand functions can be rationalized by downward sloping individual de-
mand functions with intergroup externalities. 
Proof: See Section 2.3. 
We will discuss the intuitive ideas of our proof of Theorem 1 in the follow-
ing proof sketch. The detailed proof for Theorem 1 will be given in Appendix. 
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Price 
Nesting condition ‘丨 
Group 1 •• 
� ( b i , b 2 ) 
Group 1 k 2 
y< (ci，c2) 
Group 2 ^ N . 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Quantity demanded 
Figure 2: Market demand function D(p) for two groups 
Proof sketch: 
For simplicity, let the observed market demand function D{p) be as given 
in Figure 2. For example, let the market demand be as followings: 
(ai,a2) = (0,10), (61,62) = (6,4), 
(ci’C2) = (3’1)， ⑷，而）=(8,0). 
The market demand curve (Figure 6) is as the following: 
4 < p < 10 
p=lq-2 l < p < 4 (8) 
1 . 6 - 0 . 2 ^ 0 < p < 1. 
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To rationalize it, we assume that there are two groups of consumers. 
First, the market demand has three kinkied points, namely, p = a?, p = &2 
and p = C2. The two individual demand functions are piecewise linear, with 
these three kinked points. So Xi and X2 are in the form of: 
xi = a\ — (3[p + 71^2 b2<p<a2 (9a) 
xi = a i - Pip + 71^2 C2 < p < 62 (9b) 
二 a'l - P'Ip + 71^2 0 < p < C2 (9c) 
X2 = Oi2- fy + 72^1 62 < P < (10a) 
X2 = a2- P2P + 72^1 C2<v<h (10b) 
= + 0 < p < C2. (10c) 
We want to choose unknown parameters so that 
xi and X2 rationalize D(p). (11) 
The straight forward approach requires us to solve X2) as defined 
in (9) and (10) in terms of the unknown parameters a^, a i , a'/, 
/?('，7i, 0 ； 2 ， 0 ^ ' ， 阅 , 7 2 . And then we can find these unknown 
parameters in terms of ai, 02,61,62, ci, C2, oJi, However the calculations are 
quite complicated. Nevertheless, we can simplify the calculation by making 
the following assumption: 
We further assume that within different price ranges, different groups will 
consume as given in Figure 2. 
For b2 <P < only group 1 will consume. (12) 
For C2 < p < &2， both groups will consume. (13) 
For = 0 S p S C2, only group 2 will consume. (14) 
Using (13), (9b) and (10b), we have (4). We can easily solve a i , Q!2,7i,72 
in terms of "i’/?2. Then we choose "2 accordingly and any > 0, and we 
can find a i , 0:2，71，72. 
Then using (9a) and (12), D{p) = a[ - (3[p for p e (62,02). So we can 
solve (3[ in terms of ai, 
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Similarly using (10c) and (14), D{p) = a'^ - /3!^p for p e (0’ ca). We can 
solve a j ’ in terms of ci, C2, (ii, <^2-
Finally, it remains to find a'/，风,0；^巡.Using (14)，(9c) and (10c), we 
can solve a'l,l3'{. Similarly, using (12), (9a) and (10a), we can solve o^,战. 
For a detailed proof, see Appendix. 
For example, given the market demand function (8)，a solution of indi-
vidual demands to this market demand is 
‘10 -p -2.3x2 for 10 > p > 4 
a；! 二 7.2 -0 .3p - 2 M 2 for 4 > p > 1 
[7.2 -0.3p -2.3X2 for l > p > 0 
{4.4 -0 .5p -0.4x1 for 10 > p > 4 3.2 -0.2p -OAxi for 4> p> 1 8 —5p -0.4a;i for 1 > p > 0. 
The individual demands obtained are downward sloping but kinked. Fig-
ure 7 shows the individual demand curve for Group 1; while Figure 8 shows 
the individual demand curve for Group 2. 
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2.3 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 
To rationalize a given market demand function, our method will make use of 
a nesting property for individual demand functions. 
Definition 2 (Nesting condition:) 
Let market demand D(p) be rationalized by two individual demand func-
tions xi{p) and X2{p). We say the rationalization (xi{p), X2{p)) satisfies the 
nesting condition if there exists prices a ? � 6 2 � Q z � 0 such that: 
a2> p> b2 > 0 , X2 = 0 
62 > p > C2 ,:r2 > 0 (15) 
C2 > p > 0 > 0 , = 0 
where x\ and 全2 are defined by equation (7) in Definition (1). 
More generally, suppose market demand D{p) is rationalized by indi-
vidual demand functions Xi{p), .••，Xn{p)- Then we say the rationaliza-
tion ('xi(p)/ • •, Xnip)) satisfies the nesting condition if there exists prices 
p i � � � p 2 3 � � • • •�pTX�o7 ^ h that: 
p i � p � z ^ Xi > 0 , X2 = Xs = • " = Xn = 0 
� p � p 2 ^ Xi ,X2> 0 , X3 = X4 = • • • = Xn = 0 
� p � � 全 2 � 0 ， 二 0 ， = 士4 = . •.=全n 二 0 (16) 
> p > 0 =4> > 0 , Xi = X2 = ' • ' = Xn-1 二 0 
where xi - --Xn are defined by equation (7) in Definition (1). 
Katz and Spiegel (1996) do not explicitly mention this property but their 
market demand curves actually satisfy our nesting property. 
Our proof method shows that given any market demand functions, we can 
find rationalization satisfies this nesting property and are downward sloping. 
To simplify the matter, we assume Na = Nb = 1 throughout. 
''Refer to Figure 5 for the labelling of prices. 
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Lemma 1 If market demand curve D(p) satisfying (AS) has 3 kinked points 
a2 > > C2； then it has a rationalization Xi and X2 which satisfy the nesting 
condition. Xi and X2 are in the form of: 
xi(p) 二 + 71 知(P)， 知(P) = + 72^1 (p) (17) 
where 
'xi{p) = 0 P � a 2 
^ -P[P b2<p<a2 
^ XIIP) = ai -(3ip C2<p<b2 
xiip) =a'{ -P'Ip 0<p<C2 
^X2(p) = 0 P � 5 2 
^ X2IP) 二 b2<P <0.2 Qgx 
、a:2(p) = - f k p C 2 < P < b 2 
X2{v) =Oi'i -P2P 0<p<C2 
where 
參茂2 S <^ 2. 
Detailed proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix. 
Remark 5 In Lemma 1, the kinked points of the functions Xi{p) and X2{p) 
are the same as that of the market demand function D{p). 
As shown in Appendix, by induction, we can extend Lemma (1) into a 
more general result. 
Lemma 2 If market demand curve D(p) satisfying (AS) has (2n—1)® kinked 
points, pi > > ... > p". Then it has a rationalization Xi, X2, • • •, x^ 
which satisfy the nesting condition. Xi, X2, - -•, Xn are in the form of: 
Xi{p) =0^ 1 Cp) + 712:^2(p) + . . • + llnXniv) 
X2{p) =X2{p) + 721^1 (p) + 723:^3(p) + • . • + ^2nXn{p) 
(19) 
Xn-l{p) 二 + 7 n - l ’ i a ^ l ( P ) +7n-l,2a:2(P) 
H 1- 7n-l,71-2^71-2(P) + 7n-l ,n5n(p) 
Xn{p) =Xn{p) + lnlXl(p) + 7712^2 (p) + . . • + 1 ^ n— 1 (P) 
^By Definition (AS), there is an odd number of kinked points. 
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where 
'x i{p) = 0 p > p ^ 
XiIp) = a } - 两 p p'^<p< p^ 
‘x,(p) = af -两p 
、 工 - P f p 0 < p < 
'x2{p) = 0 p � 沪 2 
3：2问 二 a! —Pip 乡12 
二 a i -Pb 
‘X 2 i p ) 二 Q!! -Pb p23 < p < p2 
工 2(P)= -(SIP p'<P< 
M p ) = -Plv 0 < p < 
： (20) 
[Xr^.M = 0 P 〉 产 - 1 
Xn-l(p) = a^-l —hp < P < 尸—2’"-l 
Xn-l{p) = al-1 -Pl-lP <P< ^^“―2’n-l 
U n - l ( p ) = -Pl-lP 广 1，" <P< 广 1 
Xn-l{p) = —hp Pn <P< 
^Xn-l(p) = -/^LlP 0 <P< P"" 
(Xn(p) = 0 P > 严 
工 n ( P ) = Oi -PIp < P < 扩-1’" 
‘xnip) = p^ <p< pn-1’" 
、a^nW 二 Q^i 0 < P < 广 
where 
• pi > 
• pi > 产’“ 
• pi > 广 1,". 
Proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix. 
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Proof of Theorem 1: 
Theorem 1 asserts the existence of rationalization, without requiring the 
nesting property. 
Lemma 2 shows the existence of rationalization which even satisfies the 
nesting property. 
So, Theorem 1 is actually a special case of Lemma 2. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
Without the (AS) assumption, the market demand will look like that in 
Figure 3. 
Before the proof, we first need to divide the market demands into different 
sections. 
The market demand is divided into different sections such that if 
V^|(po>P>Pi) < 0, VL>|(pi>p>p2) > 0’vi^|(p2>p>p3) < 0， 
then Vp G {pi,Po) is in one section, Vp G is in another section and 
Vp G (P3’P2) is in another section. 
For example, in Figure 3, the market demand is divided into three Sec-
tions: 1，2 and 3. 
Lemma 3 Let a continuous D : [C2’&2] 一 股++，3 a finite number /c > 0 
such that k > VD{p) > 0 for all but finitely many p. 
Then 3 continuous Xi, x^ ： [(2,62]肢 and 7 1， 7 2 < 0 such that 
1. xi{p), X2{p) > 0 for all p G [C2’ 62' • 
2. Vxi(p), •a;2(P) < 0 for all but finitely many p G (C2’ 62). 
3. The equations 
xi(p) 二 :ci(P)+7i无2(P) (21) 
Mp) 二勤 ( P ) + 7 2而 ( P ) 
define continuous functions Xi, X2 : [c2, &2] M+ satisfying 
xi{p) + X2{p) = Dip) Vp G [C2,62] (22a) 
Xi{p),X2{p)>0 V p e f e A ) (22b) 





Group 1 •• Section 1 
X. { b i M ) = 
r ^ Section 2 
Group 1 & 2 / 
X. ( C i ’ C 2 ) � = 
Group 2 Section 3 
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 ~ I Quantity demanded 
Figure 3: Market demand function D{p) without (AS) assumption for two 
groups 
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Proof of Lemma 3: 
First, we will derive some implications of the conditions (21) and (22). 
We write (21) into the matrix form: 
• 1 - 7 1 ] = [工 I (叫 （23) 
- 7 2 1 J [x2{p)\ ~ L工2(P)J • 
Therefore, as long as we choose 71, 72 satisfying 1 — 7172 ^ 0, we can 
ensure (21) defines uniquely functions ^i, X2 ： [c2,62] — M+. 
Then explicitly by (23), we have: 
xi{p) = - - ( x i ( p ) ^ i X 2 ( p ) ) 
1 - 严 2 (24) 
X2(P) = Z (X2(p) + 72Xl(p)). 
1 - 7I72 
Substitute (24) into (22a), we have 
Dip) = ~ ( x i { p ) ( l + 72) + X2{p){l + 71)). 
1 - 7I72 
Rearranging, we have: 
Xi{p) == - 7172) — a;2(p)(l + 71)1. (25) 
1 + 7 2 
Substitute (24) into (22b) and (22c), we have: 
a;2(C2) = D(C2), Xi(C2) = -7IX2(C2) = - J i D ( c 2 ) , 
xiib2) = D{b2), 0:2(62) = -723:1(62) = -l2D[h2). ^ J 
Now, we will choose xi, 71 and 72 as follows: 
We choose any 72 < 0, the linear function X2 : [c2,62] —> R++ where 
；r2(C2) = D(C2) and 0:2(62) = —？之！？⑷ such that 
• 眷 - - : 〜 ) ， ) < 0 (27) 
O2 - C2 
Then we choose any 71 < 0 satisfying (23) and choose the function Xi : 
C2,62] — R++ defined by (25). 
Then X2(p) defined by (21) satisfies (22a) and (22c). 
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It remains to ensure properties 1 and 2 and (22b). 
To obtain property 1’ by our choice of 工2(厂)’ we already have X2{p) > 0. 
Rechoosing if necessary, we can assume that 
> 0, 1 - 7 I 7 2 > 0 , 1 + 7i < 0. (28) 
1 + 72 
Then 
xi{p) = - 7172) - + 7i)l > 0. 
1 + 7 2 
This proves property 1. 
Next to prove property 2, by differentiating (25) w.r.t. p, we obtain: 
Vxi(p) = — 7172) - •冗2(P)(1 + 7i)]-
1 + 7 2 
By re-choosing 71 and 72 if necessary, we can assume that (1 — 7172) 
sufficiently close to 0 and |7i| sufficiently large such that 
k(l - 7172) < (1 + 71)•工2(P)9 Vp e (C2, 62). 
So, Vxi(p) < 0 for all but finitely many p. Hence property 2 follows. 
It remains to prove (22b), by (24), we have: 
(1 - 7I72)Si(P) 二 工i(P) + 7I^2(P) 
= - 4 — [ D ( p ) ( 1 - 7172) - ^2(p)(l + 71)] + 71 工2(P) by (25) 
1 + 72 
二 (1 -7i72)[i^(p) 
二 1 + 72 
_ ,、 Dip) - X2{p) 
她 二 1 + 72 • 
..• D{p) = X2{p) &tp = C2, ••D(p) > 0, VX2{p) < 0 Vp e (C2, 62), 
• . • , i ( r t = � q : _ ) � o 树 2 A ) . 
1 + 72 
9For example, we may choose 71, 72 satisfying (28) such that 71 = - 1 / e and 72 = -e^, 
where e > 0 but close to 0. 
29 
Similarly, 
By (24) and (25), we have: 
_ , 、 _ 工 2 ( P ) + 7 2 则 
工2 � 二 r r ^ ~ • 
.•• a^2(P)+72乃(P) = 0 at p = &2 and Vx^ip) < 0’V_D(p) > 0 Vp G ^ , 6 2 ) , 
� ( � V X 2 ( p H 7 2 V B M ^ n 
• 工 = ( T T ^ < 
...X2{v) + > 0 VpG ( C 2 , 6 2 ) . 
, . 參 工 : 洲 〉 0 v p e ( c „ M . 
1 + 7 2 
This proves (22b). This proves Lemma 3. Q.E.D. 
To obtain Theorem 2, for the non-downward sloping sections, we can use 
Lemma 3 to handle. For the downward sloping sections, individual demands 
are found by similar methodology in Step 4 (4b and 4c) of proof of Lemma 
1 in Appendix. Q.E.D. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
In this paper, upward sloping piecewise linear market demand functions can 
be rationalized by piecewise linear downward sloping individual demand func-
tions with intergroup externalities. The assumption of piecewise linear de-
mand functions is justifiable because from practical point of view, there are 
only finitely many observations. Plotting these finitely many observations 
will generate piecewise linear demands. With the presence of intergroup ex-
ternalities, the individual demands can be downward sloping while market 
demand is upward sloping. As a result, under intergroup externalities, the 
implication of our paper is that the hypothesis of negative price effect on 
individual demand is empirically not testable. 
There are other interesting topics that can be explored. For instance, one 
may carry out equilibrium analysis on the piecewise linear upward sloping 
market demands in various market contexts e.g. Stackelberg model, Bertrand 
and Cournot competition. 
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2.5 Appendix 
2.5.1 Proofs for Paper 1 
We will first prove Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Step 1: (Finding Xi, x^ forp G [C2’&2].j 
We will first choose a i , a2, Pi, 7i and 72. We will introduce "inter-
mediate" terms Xi{p) and X2{p). We require 1 - 7172 + 0. Then for each 
p e [c2,62], there exists unique Xi(p) and X2(p) satisfy: 
xi(p) = a i - Pip + 71^2(p) C2 < p < 62 (29a) 
X2{p) = - P2P + 72 无 1 ( P ) C 2 < p < 62. ( 2 9 b ) 
As will be shown in Step 4 below, we can choose CKI, Q!2, /3I, fh, 7i and 
72 such that xi{p) and 无2(P) satisfy: 
二 + for C 2 < p < b 2 (30) 
躺 （31) 
= 0 
秘 2) = 0 (32) 
Xi{b2) = 6 1 > 0 
无2(C2) = Ci > 0 
二 S ^ } for a l l " 一 2 ) . (33) 
Proof of equation (33): 
Xi(c2) = 0 Xi{c2) + 7l无2(C2) = 0 Xi{c2) = —71 办(匚2) = " 7 1 Cl > 0. 
Xi(b2) = Xi(b2) = � 0 ’ by linearity, Xi{p) > 0 for all p G (02,62). 
Similarly, X2{p) > 0 for all p G (€2,62)-
This proves equation (33). 
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Claim 1 For p 6 [c2, &2I； 
M p ) + 全 2(P) = D(p)’ 
£i(p) = > 0， 
士2 ( p )=无2 ( P ) > 0. 
In other words, Xi, X2 rationalize D{p) forp e [02,62]. 
Proof of Claim 1: 
The parameters of xi and X2 will only give rise to a unique set of solutions 
for xi{p) and X2(p) such that Xi{p) > 0 and 无2(P) > 0. Therefore,全 i(p)= 
xi{p) > 0 and X2{p) 二 办(P) > 0. And market demand D(p) = xi(p) + 全2(P) 
for C2 <p < &2- Indeed, xi{p) and X2{p) also satisfy the nesting condition. 
This proves Claim 1. 
Step 2: (Finding Xi, X2 forp > 62J 
We are given a i , a2, A , 7i and 72 in Step 1. We will now choose a i , 
oi'2, 0,2- We will introduce "intermediate" terms xi{p) and 办(p). We 
require 1 — 7172 0. Then for each p > 62, there exists unique xi{p) and 
X2{p) satisfy: 
xi {p) = a\ 一 (3[p + liX2{v) h<P<0'2 (34a) 
无2(p) = q4 - fy + 72^1 {p) b2<p<d2 (34b) 
D{p) = xi{p) for b2<p<a2 (35) 
Si<2} 一 一 _ 
We set 
xi(p) = D{p). 
So this determines Then we will have + 全2(P) = D{p), once we 
can ensure that 全2(P) 二 • for all p > 62, as will be shown in Step 4 below, 
we can choose Q;'2，P'2, 02 carefully such that 
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1. Q!2 - "2石2 = 0；2 - " 他 . 
2. a'2 - + 72(0；； - P'lP) < 0 for all p > 62. 
3. 0,2 < a2 such that a'2 - = 0 and o^ _ P'aip) < 0 for all p > 0,2-
Claim 2 For p > 62, we have: 
士 i(P) = 
全 2(P) = 0. 
In other words, Xi, X2 rationalize D{p) forp > 62-
Proof of Claim 2: 
The parameters of Xi and X2 will give rise to a unique set of solutions 
for xi{p) and 办(p). When X2ip) = 0’ Xi(p) 二 a i - (3[p = xi{p) > 0; when 
Xi(p) > 0，X2{p) = Q；^ - fy + l2Xi{p) = Oi'2 - P'2[p) + 72(ai _ P'lP) < 0. By 
(7)，X2(p) = 0. Thus, market demand D{p) = Xi{p). Also, Xi{p) and X2{p) 
satisfy the nesting condition. 
This proves Claim 2. 
Step 3: (Finding xi, X2 forp < C2.) 
We are given a i , 0:2, Pi, 7i and 72 in Step 1. We will now choose 
0.2 and / ? � . W e will introduce "intermediate" terms Xi{p) and X2{p). We 
require 1 — 7172 + 0. Then for each p < C2, there exists unique xi{p) and 
无2(P) satisfy: 
(p) == c// — (3'Ip + 71 办(P) 0 < p < C2 (37a) 
{p) 二 q4' - P'^p + 72S1 (ri 0 < p < C2 (37b) 
D{p) = X2(p) for 0 < p < C2 (38) 
for 0 < p < C2. (39) 
> 0 / 厂 、 
We set 
工 2(P) = D{p). 
So this determines a'^, Then we will have Xi{p) + X2(P) = D{p), once we 
can ensure that xi{p) = 0 for all p < C2, as will be shown in Step 4 below, 
we can choose a'( and carefully such that 
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1. a'； - P'{C2 = a i - P1C2. 
2. < - _ + 7 1 K - K v ) < 0 Vp < C2. 
Claim 3 For p < C2, we have: 
MP) = 0， 
X2{p) = D{p). 
In other words, xi, x^ rationalize D{p) for p < C2. 
Proof of Claim 3: 
The parameters of Xi and X2 will give rise to a unique set of solutions 
for xi{p) and 元2(P). When xi(p) = 0’ X2(p) = ol'^ - 阅 p = X2{p) > 0; when 
X2{p) > 0, x,{p) = a'i - P'Ip + 71 知(ri 二 4 - Kip) + 71 (0^ 2 _ P'^P) < By 
(7)，xi{p) = 0. Thus, market demand D{p)=全2(P). Also, xi{p) and 至2(P) 
satisfy the nesting condition. 
This proves Claim 3. 
Step 4： (Selection of parameters.) 
Step (4a) (Choosing ai, a2, "1，(h，7i andjz satisfying (30), (31) and (32).) 
For p e [c2,62], we make use of equation (29). 
For p = 62,无 1 = h and x^ 二 0’ by equation (29a), we have 
a i = 61 + P i h > 0. (40) 
For p 二 C2, X2 = Ci and xi = 0, by equation (29b), we have 
a2 二 ci + /?2C2 > 0. (41) 
Also at point (61,62), by equation (29b), we can find 72: 
X2 = a2- + 72^ 1 二 0 
72 = ^ . (42) 
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We can also express 72 in terms of (^ 2 only, by substituting (41) into 
(42). 
= (43) 
To ensure 72 < 0, we can choose a small /?2 > 0 such t h a t i � 
Ci+"2(C2""&2)�0 . (44) 
Similarly, at point (Ci’C2)，by equation (29a), we can find 71： 
Xi = a i — P1C2 + 7iCi = 0 
= ( 4 5 ) 
Cl 
We can also express 71 in terms of only, by substituting (40) into 
(45). 
= + < 0. (46) 
Cl 
So, we can choose /?2 satisfying (44) and any (5i > 0, then Q;I, 0^ 2, 7u I2 
are determined by (40)，(41), (43) and (46). Then (32) automatically 
holds. 
To guarantee that xi{p) > 0 and X2(p) > 0 for C2 < p < 62, we need 
Xi{p) and 无2(P) to be linear in p. 
Therefore, Xi{p) and 元2(P) are linear in p because xi{p) and X2{p) are 
linear in p. 
lONote that if ci = 0’ then 72 defined in (43) cannot be negative. So we only deal with 
market demand defined in (PL) where D{p) > 0 for all p < po. 
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Since 无 1(62) 二 ^2(^2) = 0, 
and X2{c2) = Ci, 5i(C2) = 0. 
So, by the linearity of xi(p) and 无2(P), ^i(p) > 0 and X2(p) > 0 Vp 6 
(c2,62). This proves (31). 
To prove (30), D(p) = xi(p) + 元2(P) at p = 62, C2. By linearity, D(p)= 
Xi(p) + X2(p) for all p e (02,62)- This proves (30). 
We can conclude that the procedure to find the demands of the groups 
for 62 > P > C2 is as follows: 
1. Choose > 0 satisfying (44) and choose any /?i > 0. 
2. Choose Q；!, Q!2 > 0 satisfying (40) and (41). 
3. Choose 7i, 72 < 0 satisfying (46) and (43). 
Step (4b) (Choosing (y.\, q;'2，and p'�satisfying (35) and (36).) 
For p > 62, we make use of equation (34). 
71，72 are given by (46) and (43). The externalities do not differ for 
different price ranges. 
At point (61,62), p = 62, = 0 and Si = 61, by equation (34a), we 
have: 
a i = &i+代&2; (47) 
and by equation (34b), we have: 
Q4 二 — 7 2 � + i 5 � 2 . (48) 
Substituting (43) into (48), we have: 
a'2 = c i + p2(C2 — 62) + 爲&2 > 0. (49) 
At point (ai, 02), p = a2,无1 二 0 and we make use of ^2(02) < 0’ which 
will be guaranteed later. 
By equation (34a), we have: 
a'l = (5[a2 > 0. (50) 
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By (47) and (50), we have: 
= - V > 0. (51) 
a2 - 02 
To satisfy the condition that < 0 at p = a2, we have: 
X2 = Ci+ /?2(C2 - b2) + 一 + + P'A 一 M < 0. 
By equation (43)， 
Ci + — &2) + 72&1 = 0. 
. . . = 一 + l2{fS[b2 - PW2) < 0 
P'2 > - 7 2 ( - V ) > 0. (52) 0,2 — O2 
So, are determined by (50) and (51). We can choose satisfying 
(52), then a'2 is determined by (49). Then, a2 is determined by ol'2 — 
P'2 如=0. 
Claim 4 For 62 < P < 元2(P) < 
Proof of Claim 4' 
By (52), we have 
P'2 > -72^； 
2 - - 7 2 / ^ 1 ( ^ 2 - P ) . 
By (43), 
[ci + /?2(C2 - &2) + 726i] + /?2&2 " fy < l l W ' ^ M " M 
ci + /?2(C2 - h) + P'2b2 — fy + 72(61 + P'ib2 - (3[p) < 0 
X2{p) < 0 for b2 <p < 02-
So, this proves Claim 4. 
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To guarantee that xi(p) > 0 for 02 > p > 62, we check it: 
Since 办(p) < 0 for 62 < P < then xi{p) = a ; — (3[p + 71^2(p)= 
xiijp) + 71^2(p) > 0 for 62 < P < (^2- This proves (36). 
So, the procedure to find the demands of the groups for p > 62 is as 
follows: 
1. Choose 风〉0 satisfying (51). 
2. Choose a'l > 0 satisfying (50). 
3. Choose > 0 satisfying (52). 
4. Choose � 0 satisfying (49). 
Step (4c) (Choosing a'；, a'i, (3'； and (5'i satisfying (38) and (39).) 
For p < C2, we make use of equation (37). 
71’ 72 are given by (46) and (43). The externalities do not differ for 
different price ranges. 
At point (ci, C2), V = 02， 1^ = 0 and X2 = Ci, by equation (37a), 
o/[ = - 7 i c i + "；'C2. 
Substituting (46) into the above equation, we have: 
ai' = &i + /?i(&2-C2) + ^ C 2 � 0 . (53) 
By equation (37b), 
C/2' = c i + ^ C 2 � 0 . (54) 
At point (di,d2), p = 0, X2 = di and we make use of ^1(^2) < 0 which 
will be guaranteed later. 
By equation (37b), 
= + (55) 
By equation (54) and (55), 
� = ^ ^ = ^ [ l z £ 1 � O . (56) 
丄 C2 - d2 C2 
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For 无 1 < 0 at p = = 0, 
A (&2 - C2) + (3'；02 + 71 (ci + P2C2) < 0. (57) 
By equation (46), 
bi + Pi{b2 - C2) + 7iCi 二 0. 
The inequality (57) becomes: 
K < - l i P ' i > 0. (58) 
So, c4'，are determined by (54) and (56). We can choose (3'{ satisfying 
(58), then a'( is determined by (53). 
To guarantee that xi(p) < 0 and 元2(P) > 0 for 0 < p < C2, we check 
below: 
Claim 5 For 0 < p < C2, Xi(p) < 0. 
Proof of Claim 5: 
By (58), we have 
K < -71 巡 
By (46), 
[61 + - C2) + 7iCi] + Kc2 - (3'IP < -7i(/3?C2 — 
hi + A ( 6 2 — C2) + KC2 - (3'IP + 7 1 (ci + P2C2 -阅:p) < 0 
Xi{p) < 0 for 0 <p < C2. 
So, this proves Claim 5. 
To guarantee that > 0 for 0 < p < C2, we check it: 
Since xi{p) < 0 for 0 < p < C2, then X2{p) = a'^ - P2P + 72^1 ( p ) = 
X2(p) + 72^1 (p) > 0 for 0 < p < C2. This proves (39). 
So, the procedure to find the demands of the groups for 0 < p < C2 is 
as follows: 
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1. Choose (3'i > 0 satisfying (56). 
2. Choose a^ > 0 satisfying (54). 
3. Choose (3'{ > 0 satisfying (58). 
4. Choose a'l > 0 satisfying (53). 
Q.E.D. 
Summary of the results of the proof: 
As shown, the two groups' demands which can be found to rationalize 
any given piecewise linear market demand functions satisfying (AS) are as 
follows: 
(x,= {h + -么P +71^2 b2<p<a2 
< = 6i + Pib2 -(hp +71^2 C2<p<b2 
= h + A(62 - C2) + I3'{C2 -KP +71^2 0 < p < C2 
{ X2 = Cl + 伪(C2 — 62) + 贴2 -P2P +72^1 b2<P<a2 
X2 = Cl + P2C2 -thp + 7 2 至 1 C 2 < V < H 2 
X2= di - ^ P +72：^! 0<p<C2 
where …， � 
71 = 
Cl 
Cl + 从C2 - 62) 
72 = ^ 
Choose any Pi > 0’ and > 0 s.t. ci + - ^2) > 0 
02 
P2 > - 7 2 ( ^ ) . 
02 — O2 
41 
Next, we will prove Lemma 2 in the following. 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
We will prove Lemma 2 by Mathematical Induction. 
Assume we can find all the groups' demands for n groups. 
Xi(p) = Xi{p) + 712^2 "I 1- Tln^n 
X2{p) = X2{p) + 721^1 + 723^3 H 1" l2,nXn 
： (59) 
Xn-l{p) 二 + 7n-l,l^l H 1- ln-l,n-2Xn-2 + 7n-l,n^n 
• • • + 'yn,n—l^n—l 
where . • • are defined as in (20). 
Note that (59) rationalizes part (A) of Figure 4 and satisfies nesting 
property (16). 
Then, for (n+1) groups, we need to modify Xn for p e [0’p"’"+i] and find 
5n+l (P) = Xn+1 ip) + 7n+l’l5l + … + 7n+l，n无n for p G [0,广奸丄](60) 
such that they rationalize part (B) of Figure 4 and satisfies nesting property 
(16). 
We need Xn+i(p) < 0 for p e (p""，"+i,p ), which will be guaranteed later. 
So, the demand of Group (n + 1) is irrelevant for the finding of the remaining 
n groups' demands. 
For p e [0’p^’n+ij’ xi, • •.，Xn-i < 0 which will be guaranteed later. 
By the assumption that we can find all the groups' demand for n groups, 
the unknowns left are 7i’n+i, 72’n+i,…，7n’n+i，7n+i’i，7n+i’2’ …，7n+i，n， 
c^t / % ， P I P“I, 4 + 1 and 
Using the method for the two-group case, we can solve for the followings: 
( X n = a l - f y +7n,n4-l5n+l 广时^  < P < 
{Xn= ai — + 7 一 l5n+l 产1<P<广州 
[ X n = -P'nP +7n,n+l5n+l 0 < P < P^+l 
(Xn+1 = a i + i - 忠 + 7 n + l , n 5 n 广 糾 < p < ’奸 1 
I = O^Kl - P l ^ l P +7n+l’n5n < P < 
[^ n+l = O^l+l -^l+lP +ln+l,nXn 0 < p < p奸 1. 
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Price 
Nesting Condition .. 
t " - ^ 1 
Group 1 
Group 1 & 2 •“ 
V. (A) 
r ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Group {n — 1) k n ^ ‘ 
Group n 一 
Group n k (n + 1) 
X (B) 
Group (n + 1) 
^ 1 1 H — ^ 1 1 1 1 J Quantity demanded 
Figure 4: Market demand curve for (n+1) groups 
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We want to obtain: 
Xn 二 for 广 < p < 
Xn + 全时 1 = Dip) for p 时 1 <p< 广 糾 （61) 
Xn+i = D{p) for 0 < p < p 时 1. 
Applying the results of Lemma 1: 
p n = (^ 1 + - 去 P +7n’n+l5n+l < P < 
< Xn = bi + - P n P +7n,n+l5n+l C2 < J) < h 
{xn = h + P ^ i h - C2) + -P^nP +7n，n+l5n+l 0 = 而 < p < C2 
(Xn+1 = -Pn+lP +7n+l,n5n 62 < P < 
< Xn+l = C i + "“1C2 - P l + l P +7n+l,n5n C2 < V < h 
= di - ^ P +7n+l,n5n 0 二而 < p < C2 
where ., � 
7n,n+l = 
7n+l’n — ^ 
Choose any /？^  > 0 and > 0 s.t. Ci + 忠+i(C2 - 62) > 0 
C2 
Pn+1 > -7n+l .n( ^^  , ) (22 — 02 
a2=P^ 6 2 = P"’"+1 d 2 = : P"+ l，时2 = 0 
ai = q{pn 二 g(P"，"+i) = 乂 c i i = 时 1 对2). 
Then, the unknowns left are 
7l,n+l 72,n+l 73,n+l • • • 7n-l„n+l 
7n+l’l 7n+l’2 7n+l，3 . . . 7n+l’n-l. 
We want to choose the above 7s to be very negative so that X i , … ’ 
< 0 for p e [0’p"’"+i] a n d Xn+i{p) < 0 for p G (p"’时 
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At the point (Wp"+i),p"+i)，无n+i = g(P"+i)’ to ensure 无1’. • •，无„-i < 0, 
it suffices to have: 
a? - A V + i „ 
7n-l’n < ^ ^ = “ - 1 . 
At the point = to ensure S i , … ’ Xn-l < 
0, it suffices to have: 
4 —所 pn+l’n+2 — D 
7l，n+l < — ~ 咖 奸 1 对 2 ) = 坊 
^ -成广+l ’n+2 — D 
72’n+l < g(广+l’n+2) = 
^ - " L l 严 _ 
7n-l,n+l < 咖n+l，n+2) ="几-1. 
Let 
G < min{Ci, C2�…,Cn-i, B2,…， 
Choose 
7ln = 72n = • • • = 7n-2’n = G. 
Similarly, to ensure Xn+i{p) < 0 for p G it suffices to have: 
7n+l’l < ^ ~ = El 
7"+1’2 ^ — 7n+l’2 < - 咖 2 3 ) — 
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. 心 1 - 耽 + i p 3 n ^ < 心 1 - "“1 产 _ P 
7n+l，n-l < = Dn-1 7n+l,n-l < “ * n - l ’ n ) _ 么“斗 
Let 
H < m i n { D 2 , D3,…，-Dn-i,丑1’ 五2，…，丑n-i}-
Choose 
7n+l’l = 7n+l’2 = . •.二 7n+l’n-l = H. 
Therefore, for ( n + 1 ) groups, we can find a set of piecewise linear down-
ward sloping groups' demands 无丄’.•，Xn+i satisfying the nesting property to 
rationalize the given market demand function. By mathematical induction, 
Vn > 2, we can find piecewise linear downward sloping groups' demands sat-
isfying the nesting property to rationalize the given piecewise linear market 
demand function. Q.E.D. 
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2.5.2 Graphs for Paper 1 
Price 
Nesting Condition .. 
Group 1 
Group 1 & 2 
Group 2 
Group 2 & 3 � 厂 
Group 3 & 4、， 
Group n 1 1—~i 1 1 1 1 1 1 Quantity demanded 
Figure 5: Market demand curve satisfying (AS) for n groups 
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Price 
1 1 - -
L 
0 1 1 1 -H 1 1 I 1 Quantity demanded 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 





0 1 1 1 1 1-——I P 1 1 Quantity demanded 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Figure 7: Individual Demand Curve of Group 1 
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Price 




0 1 1 1 H- 1 1~ 1 Quantity demanded 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Figure 8: Individual Demand Curve of Group 2 
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3 Signalling goods and market demand 
Abstract 
Corneo and Jeanne (1997) study the market demand of one con-
spicuous signalling good. Our paper extends their work by consider-
ing a general situation with multiple (rather than one) conspicuous 
commodities. Assuming one conspicuous good, they show that its 
demand function can be upward sloping. In our paper, new equilib-
rium concepts for the case of two conspicuous goods are developed and 
necessary conditions to find the equilibrium solution for demands are 
provided. The price effects on demands are also studied. Our result 
shows that with conformist consumer behavior, some cases always give 
rise to a downward sloping demand curve for one of the conspicuous 
goods. With snobbish consumer behavior, some cases may give rise to 
upward sloping demand curves for both goods. The basic relationship 
between the concepts of signalling values and rank utility function is 
clarified. In particular, a necessary and sufficient condition for sig-
nalling value functions to be generated by a rank utility function is 
provided. The welfare analysis on the prohibition of the conspicuous 
goods is studied. 
3.1 Introduction 
Since Veblen (1899), conspicuous consumption and status seeking have started 
to play a role in the formulation of consumer theory. To study the influence 
of status on consumption, some papers use the signalling process of wealth 
or income level while some use the real total expenditures on the conspic-
uous good.11 Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) study conspicuous goods with 
different quantities and qualities with signalling values. Corneo and Jeanne 
(1997) also study conspicuous goods with signalling values under different 
consumer behaviors. Ng (1987) studies diamond by incorporating the real 
total expenditures on the conspicuous good into the utility function. 
In this paper, we will use the approach of social status with signalling 
value, in particular, we follow the lines of Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and we 
extend their model by considering two conspicuous goods. 
11 Conspicuous goods are usually assumed to have no intrinsic utility for simplicity. 
About intrinsic utility, it can be dated back to Marx (1867). Intrinsic utility of a good is 
inherent in the good and is the use value of the good. 
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Incorporating one more conspicuous good into the model makes it more 
realistic. With only one conspicuous good, Corneo and Jeanne (1997) fail 
to study the substitution effect across the two conspicuous goods. With two 
conspicuous goods, we can study the cross effect between the two conspicuous 
goods. We can also study the substitution effect on the inconspicuous good. 
In reality, there are many examples that involve more than one conspic-
uous good for consumers to choose from. Goods with two different brand 
names may also be regarded as two distinct conspicuous goods, they may 
be handbags, cosmetics, expensive cars and watches. We will normally not 
consume two brands of the same good at the same time because one of the 
goods is enough to serve its function. Consider one who is thinking of eating 
out, if he chooses to go and eat in a Chinese Cuisine restaurant, then he can-
not at the same time present himself at another famous restaurant because 
of time constraint. 
Corneo and Jeanne (1997) show that if consumer behavior is snobbish, 
then the demand of the conspicuous good is always downward sloping. If 
the demand of the conspicuous good is upward sloping, then the consumer 
behavior must be conformist. However, the converse is not necessarily true. 
This paper will develop the new equilibrium concepts for two conspicuous 
goods and provide necessary condition to find the equilibrium solution for 
demands. 
Our results are: 
Price effect: 
While Corneo and Jeanne (1997) study the price effect on demand 
with only one conspicuous good, we do the same but with two 
conspicuous goods. We show: 
The demands of the two conspicuous goods are simultaneously 
determined. We show that for some cases for conformist consumer 
behavior always give rise to a downward sloping demand curve 
for Good B. And some cases for snobbish consumer behavior give 
rise to an upward sloping demand curve for both goods, (see 
Proposition 9 and 10) 
For cross price effect of the conspicuous goods, we find that con-
spicuous goods may be substitutes or complements of each other, 
(see Proposition 11) 
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For cross price effect on the demand of the inconspicuous good, we 
find that an increase in prices of conspicuous Good A and Good 
B may have opposite effects on the demand of the inconspicuous 
Good C. (see Proposition 12) 
Signalling value and rank utility function: 
Since we are studying the demands of conspicuous goods with sig-
nalling values and signalling values are determined by rank utility 
function, it is natural for us to determine whether the signalling 
values are consistently generated by a rank utility function. In 
our model with two conspicuous goods, given signalling values, 
the rank utility function may not exist. We provide a necessary 
and sufficient condition for it and they are stated formally in The-
orem 3. This is different from that of Corneo and Jeanne (1997), 
in which there is a one-to-one correspondence between signalling 
value and rank utility function. Thus, in their model, any sig-
nalling value function is generated by a rank utility function, but 
this is not true in our model. Moreover, we completely character-
ize the class of signalling values generated by some rank utility 
functions (see (Consistency Requirements) below). 
Welfare analysis: 
In the study of social welfare, the results of banning both conspic-
uous goods are similar to that of Corneo and Jeanne (1997). We 
show that prohibition of both conspicuous goods improves social 
welfare and may be Pareto improving, (see Proposition 13) But 
their model has only one conspicuous good, they cannot study 
the effect of banning only one conspicuous good while the other 
is still marketed. We show that prohibition of either one of the 
conspicuous goods may worsen social welfare and can never be 
Pareto improving, (see Proposition 14 and 15) 
3.2 Summary of Corneo and Jeanne (1997) 
We begin by reviewing the model of Corneo and Jeanne (1997). Corneo and 
Jeanne (1997) observe that consumers may purchase some goods that have 
no intrinsic utility. These goods are conspicuous goods. They rationalize the 
consumption of conspicuous goods as a signalling process to derive higher 
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rank utility. Rank utility is the utility derived by being perceived to be 
in higher income level. Income is private information. Others infer the 
consumer's income level by observing his consumption of the conspicuous 
good. 
They focus on two kinds of consumption behaviors for conspicuous goods. 
One is snobbish — the rank utility decreases when others are purchasing the 
good because expected level of income decreases. The other is conformist 
— t h e rank utility increases when others are purchasing the good because 
expected expected level of income increases. The kind of consumption behav-
ior depends on the rank utility which in turn depends on how social norms 
assign status to different income level. 
Their model can be summarized as the followings: 
The economy is populated by a continuum of consumers indexed by r E 
[0,1]. r > r' ^ Ur < Vr', where y denotes income. Agent with lower r has 
higher income. 
There are two consumption goods: a non-observable, divisible good re-
ferred to as the numeraire good, and an observable, indivisible good referred 
to as the conspicuous good. 
Individual's utility function is given by Ur = u{cr)-\-v{6r), where Cr is the 
consumption of the numeraire good and 5r is a dummy variable which equal 
to 0 if individual r does not consume the conspicuous good and equal to 1 if 
individual r consumes the conspicuous good. And v{6r) = E{a{r)\6r) which 
is the expectation of the rank utility conditional on the observation of 5. 
The budget constraint of individual r is given by Cr + pSr < Ur. 
They define the signalling value 
1 广 1 
=—I a(r)dr — — r / a(r)dr 
n Jo (1 - n) 7n 
=—^-[ I a{r)dr-n / a{r)dr . 
71(1 - n) Jo Jo 
Define i 




a{n) = s = ？ � H a i r ) — a]dr. (62) 
71(1 — n) JQ 
For those individuals who purchase the conspicuous good, since the con-
spicuous good gives them no intrinsic utility, the signalling value need to 
be greater than or equal to the utility forgone from the consumption of the 
numeraire. This is represented by the following inequality 
s > u(yr) - u{yr - p). 
Lemma 4 (Corneo Sz Jeanne, Lemma 1) If individual with income yr 
purchases the conspicuous good, then individuals with income greater than yr 
also purchase the conspicuous good. 
The threshold income level y is that individual r with income level higher 
than or equal to y will purchase the conspicuous good, and will not purchase 
otherwise. The threshold income level,沒(s,p)’ depends on s and p. 
To determine such y, let us consider s and p as given. Then y = y{s,p) 
is defined: 
s == w(幻 - u ( y -p) i f s < u(p) - u{0) (63) 
y = p ifs>u{p)-u{0). (64) 
The demand for the conspicuous good is n = D{s,p), when n uniquely 
satisfies: y{s,p) = Un-
The demand function for the conspicuous good depends on its price and 
the signalling value. The signalling value and the price can both be expressed 
in terms of the number of consumers, n. 
They show that for any n, there is only one p. 
Proposition 2 (Corneo Jeanne, Theorem 1) The equation n = D{s{n),p) 
defines a price function p{n) on [0,1], i.e. 
a) Vn 3p such that n = D{s{n),p) 
b)if 
n = D{s{n),p) 
n = D(s{n),p') 
then p = p'. 
55 
Their main results are these: 
Proposition 3 (Corneo Jeanne，Theorem 2) Assume that consumer 
behavior is snobbish, then the price function is decreasing in [0,1]. 
Proposition 4 (Corneo Jeanne , Theorem 3) If the demand function 
of the conspicuous good is upward sloping, then the consumer behavior is 
conformist. The converse is not necessarily true. 
Proposition 5 (Corneo &; Jeanne , Theorem 4) Prohibition of conspic-
uous consumption is socially optimal. 
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3.3 Multiple signalling goods 
3.3.1 Our Model 
We now discuss our own model. Same as Corneo and Jeanne (1997), the 
economy is populated by a continuum of consumers indexed by r € [0,1]. 
We assume: 
r>r'<^yr> Vr'-
Agent r has income yr. Agent with larger r has higher income.^^ 
While Corneo and Jeanne (1997) have only a numeraire good and a con-
spicuous good, we assume that there are a numeraire good but two conspic-
uous goods. So, in our model, there are three consumption goods C, A and 
B: 
where 
C— consumption of the numeraire good, non-observable, divisible, 
A— consumption of the conspicuous good, observable, indivisible, 
B— consumption of the conspicuous good, observable, indivisible. 
We borrow from Corneo and Jeanne (1997) the concepts on agents' utili-
ties, budget constraints and expected rank utility and we make natural mod-
ifications for our case of two conspicuous goods. 
Cr— represents the quantity consumed of Good C by Agent r. 
— represents the quantity consumed of Good A by Agent r, 
= 1 01，0. 
一 represents the quantity consumed of Good B by Agent r, 
S? = 1 or 0. 
= 1 means the agent consumes Good A. = 0 means the agent does 
not consume Good A. Similarly, S^ = 1 means the agent consumes Good B. 
S^ = 0 means the agent does not consume Good B. 
i2This is just an inessential difference from Corneo and Jeanne (1997), in which they 
assume the opposite relation, with r > r' ^ yr < Vr'- They assume it this way just for 
convenient purpose so that the demand is r, not (1 - r). However, for our case of two 
conspicuous goods, it is more convenient to assume r to be increasing with y. 
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We define the utility function of Agent r to be 
where u(-) is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave. 
lim li'(cv) = 0. 
Cr—>+00 
And the consumption of Good A and Good B yields no intrinsic utility. 
This only sends a signal about Agent r 's income level. 
^;(l，0) = E[i?(r) |(5A 
v(0 , l ) = B[R(r)ISf], 
where E[R{r)\ . ] is the conditional expectation and R{r) is a continuous 
function defined on the unit interval. More details will be given in (65) 
below. R{r) is called the rank utility. It captures the utility derived from 
the social perception of Agent r 's income level. 
Agent r chooses in order to maximize utility Ur. We restrict 
the consumption such that agents are not allowed to consume both Good A 
and Good B in order to simplify the model. The consumption of Good A 
and the consumption of Good B are assumed to be mutually exclusive. ^^  
Thus, Agent r ' s budget constraint is: 
c. + PAS^ + PB坊 < 2/r, 
+ <1. 
To determine the market demands of the two conspicuous goods, Good 
A and Good B, we need the following definitions. 
An assignment is a function 
/ : / = [ 0 ’ 1] — D = { 0 ’ A ’ B } 
which represents the demand behavior, / ( r ) = A means Agent r plans to 
purchase A, not B. / ( r ) = B means Agent r plans to purchase B, not A. 
/ ( r ) = 0 means Agent r plans not to purchase A or B. 
i3Tliis assumption is reasonable. For example, agents cannot go to restaurant A and B 
at the same time. 
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For each / , define the sets: 
lA = {reI\f(r)=A}, 
IB = {RE I\f{r) = B}, 
h = {re I\f{r) = 0}. 
Set IA is the set of all those agents who consume Good A. Set IB is the 
set of all those agents who consume Good B. Set / � is the set of all those 
agents who consume neither Good A nor Good B. 
Given a price vector (PA, -PB), an equilibrium assignment function is a 
function f : I — D satisfying the following two conditions: 
1. (Equilibrium value function) 
The value functions satisfy: 
, R(r)dr 
vil,0) = ElRir)\6^ = l] = ' ' - 咖 ， 
J/A 
D fr R{'r)dr 
y{0.1) = eir{T)\5^ = 11 = J i B , (65) 
JIB 
D R(r)dr 
v{0,0)=丑 = = 0] = • 
2. (Individual maximization) 
LI r e IA (i.e. Agent r purchases Good A), then = {YR — 
Pa, 1,0) solves 
max u{cr) + 咖；^ O s.t. c, + PaS^' + Pb6? = yr. 
If r e / b (i.e. Agent r purchases Good B), then = {yr 一 
Pb, 0,1) solves 
max + Sf) s.t. c, + PaS：^  + ^B^f = yr. 
If r G /0 (i.e. Agent r purchases neither Good A nor Good B), then 
(CVAA，(5;?) = ( I 0 , 0 ) solves 
max u(cr) + 6^) s.t. c, + PAS^' + = yr. 
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In the following, we will assume PA < PB-
To find the explicit solution for the equilibrium demands, we require the 
following Lemmas. Their proofs are given in Appendix. 
Lemma 5 The conditional expected rank utility is E[R{r)\S^ = 1] and E[R{r)\6^ = 
1] for buying Good A and Good B respectively. Then as PA < PB, one has: 
E[R{r)\6：^ = 1] < E[R{r)\6^ = 1]. 
Lemma 5 states that consumers buying Good B have a higher expected 
rank utility than consumers buying Good A. 
Lemma 6 / / r G IA, Ur' > Vr, THEN r' G J^ U IB-
Lemma 6 states that if consumer r buys Good A, then consumers with 
income higher than that of r must buy Good A or Good B. 
Lemma 7 If r e IB, Vr' > Vr, then r' G IB. 
Lemma 7 states that if consumer r buys Good B, then consumers with 
income higher than that of r must buy Good B. There is an individual r = b 
such that all individuals with income higher than that of him consume Good 
B and no one with income less than that of him consume Good B. 
Define b = inf{r E IB}- SO IB =[石’ 1 • 
Lemma 8 r <b => r e Ia^^-
Lemma 8 states that there is an individual r = b such that all individuals 
with income less than him consume Good A or nothing. 
By Lemma 6’ 7 and 8, given any 迁 f is an equilibrium assign-
ment function, then there exists a,b G [0,1] s.t. 
if r < a, then r e /(j; 
if r = a, then r is indifferent between buying Good A or nothing; 
if a < r < 6，then r G IA\ (66) 
if r = then r is indifferent between buying Good A or Good B; 
if r > 6, then r E IB. 
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We call this (a, b) pair an equilibrium critical pair for (PA, PB). 
Thus, we derive from Lemma 6，7 and 8 that there is an individual r = a 
such that he is indifferent between buying Good A or nothing and there is an 
individual r = b such that he is indifferent between buying Good B or Good 
A. Individuals with income less than ya will consume nothing. Individuals 
with income between y � a n d yb consume Good A. Individuals with income 
higher than yb consume Good B. 
Given PA, PB, if (a*, 6*) is an equilibrium critical pair, then the equilib-
rium demand of Good A and Good B are UA = b* - a* and njg = 1 - 6* 
respectively. 
Equilibrium for two conspicuous goods: 
As Corneo and Jeanne (1997) use signalling value to find equilibrium 
demand, we will do the same. But we have two conspicuous goods, we will 
have two signalling values instead of one. 
SA is the difference in expected rank utilities between consuming Good 
A and consuming nothing. SB is the difference in expected rank utilities 
between consuming Good B and consuming Good A. 
Signalling values, together with the loss in utilities in the consumption of 
the numeraire good, are used to determine the equilibrium demands of both 
conspicuous goods. 
Given the values of a and b and the underlying social rank utility function, 
R(r), we can obtain signalling values SA and SB-
Ja b-a Jo a (67) 
Define equilibrium: 
a = a*, 
b = b\ 
In summary: 
Propos i t ion 6 Given PA, PB, if (a, 6) IS an equilibrium critical pair and 
a <b, then it satisfies: 
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u(ya) = u{ya - PA) + SA (68) 
U(YB 一 PA) 二 U{YB - PB) + SB 
where SA> SB are defined by (67)” 
i4lf PA = PB, Equilibrium: 
E[R{r)\6:^ = l] = E[R{r)\6? = l], 
many equilibria are possible. 
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3.3.2 Constraints on the unobserved rank utility function 
Since we are studying demands of conspicuous goods with signalling values 
and signalling values are determined by rank utility function, it is important 
for us to determine whether the signalling values are consistently generated 
by some rank utility functions. Therefore, in this section, we will give the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the signalling values to be generated 
by a rank utility function. (See Theorem 3.) 
Given the signaling values SA and SB, 
--rs-1: ’’ 
m ‘ r s . 
we will find the unobserved Rank utility function R{r) in the following 
manner. 
First, we define 
衔a) = j : 势 r , (69) 
(70) 
Jo b 
We then derive SU(a’&) and Ssia^b) in terms of R(a) and R{b). They 
are: 
她 = — f 剛 -綱咖， 
By differentiating 5a(a, 6) and 5s(a,6), we can derive R\r) and R'^ir): 
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R\r) = R(a) - ( 1 — ; ) ( … W ’ 0 — (71) 
丄 一 a ^ ^丄一 a j 
R'ir) = R(b) + b) — 6). (72) 
The derivation of SA, SB, R^{r) and E?{r) are given in Appendix. 
We require R^{r) and to be consistent. Firstly we define: 
T i ( r ) = — ( 1 - ; ) ( … W ’ r ) -
1 — a U — a) 
Signalling values SU(a’&) and Ssia^b) must satisfy the following three 
consistency requirements for them to be generated by some rank utility func-
tions. 
Consistency Requirements: 
(1) For all a, b, where a <b: 
T\r) - T\r) = R(b) - R{a) Vr G (a, b) 
^ Ti(r) - T2(r) is constant. 
(2) 
T\a,r) — T\a',r) = R{a') - R{a) Vr G (a, 1) 
T^(a,r) - T\a',r) is constant. 
(3) 
T'(r, b) 一 b') = R(b') — R(b) Vr G (0, b) 
b) - T2(r, b') is constant. 
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We provide two examples in Appendix. One with signalling values sat-
isfying all the three consistency requirements and thus has underlying rank 
utility function. The other with signalling values not satisfying the three con-
sistency requirements and thus does not have underlying rank utility func-
tion. 
Difference and similarity with Corneo and Jeanne (1997): 
1. Difference 
In their model with one conspicuous good, given any signalling value, 
they can solve for a particular rank utility function through 
a(r) = a + (1 - 2r)a{r) + r ( l - r)a'{r). 
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the signalling value and 
the rank utility function. 
In our paper, because of the presence of two conspicuous goods, given 
any signalling values SA and SB�the rank utility function R(r) may not 
exist. The signalling values need to satisfy the above three consistency 
requirements for a R{r) function to exist. 
2. Similarity 
Given a specific rank utility function, both can solve for the signalling 
values. 
The relationship between SU(r’ 1) in our model of two conspicuous goods 
and a{r) in Comeo and Jeanne (1997)'s model of one conspicuous good: 
We will transform equation (62) of Corneo and Jeanne (1997) to fit our 
model. They assume that r is decreasing with y. To transform equation (62) 
so that r is increasing with y, which is the assumption of our model, we have: 
a(c) = 广 R{r)dr-- [ R{r)dr 
I - C Jc C JQ 
= 六 i - r 春 频 
I5TO avoid the confusion of symbols, we replace the rank utility function a{r) by R{r) 
for our model of two conspicuous goods. 
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Since c is arbitrary, we replace c by r. 
a{r) = — ? � [ \ R { r ) - R]dr. (73) 
r ( l - r ) JQ 
Differentiating equation (73) with respect to r, 
乂 M = - 匈 — ^ ^ 卜 — 周 咖 
= - • 钱 … ） 
r ( l - r)cr'(r) = -R{r) + 及—（1 一 2r)a{r) 
R(r) = R-{1-2r)(j{r) - r ( l - r)t7'(r). (74) 
Compare Equation (74) with the following that we derive earlier 
with 6 = 1 , 
R\r) = —(1 - 2r)5U(r’ 1) 一 r ( l - 0氏•SU(r^ 1). (75) 
For a given rank utility function, if it is adjusted for the constant term, 
5A(r, 1) will be equal to a{r). So, if the signalling value cr(r) in one conspic-
uous good context is known, then by equation (74) and (75), the signalling 
value of buying Good A with 6 = 1 , 5A(r, 1) in two conspicuous goods con-
text is also known, provided that the rank utility functions in both contexts 
are the same. The resemblance of Equations (74) and (75) can be explained 
easily. Since 5a(r, 1) is the signalling value of buying Good A with 6 = 1 ’ i.e. 
no one buys Good B, the model is degenerated into one with one conspicuous 
good. Thus, the two signalling values should be identical. 
Then, by using the techniques we will derive be low,从a , b) and SB�CL, b) 
can be found out. 
We now review a result of Corneo and Jeanne (1997) in finding the rank 
utility function a(r) from a given signalling value function. 
Fact 1 Corneo Jeanne (1997) For the case of one conspicuous good, 
given a signalling value function a{r), one can find the unobserved rank utility 
function a(r) by the following formula: 
a{r) = a + (1 - 2r)a{r) + r ( l — r)cr'(r). 
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In contrast with Corneo and Jeanne (1997)，s fact, our propositions are 
shown below. 
Given the signalling value a(r) in the model of one conspicuous good, we 
can provide signalling values 5U(a’b), Ssia^b) in the model of two conspic-
uous goods such that the rank utility function is consistent to that in the 
model with one conspicuous good. 
Proposit ion 7 Given SA(CL, 1) and R{1), one can derive SU(a，b) and ^^(a, b) 
by using the consistency requirements (1), (2) and (3). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 8 Given SU(a’ 1) and R{1), one can use to find b) 
and SB{a,b) which satisfies the consistency requirements (1), (2) and (3) 
w.r.t. the given SU(a, 1). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
We will illustrate the above two propositions with specific examples in 
Appendix. 
We now give our result, which provides a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the signalling values to be generated by some rank utility functions. 
Theorem 3 
1) Consider functions SA{a,b) and 6). If SA{a,b), SB(a,b) satisfy 
the three consistency requirements, then they are generated by a rank utility 
function. 
2) Conversely, if S从a,b)’ are generated by a rank utility func-
tion, then they satisfy the three consistency requirements. 
Proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix. 
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3.3.3 Snobbish versus conformist 
In this section, we will first define two new concepts: snobbish consumer and 
conformist consumer. And we will then carry out comparative static analysis 
to study the own price effect and the cross price effect for the conspicuous 
goods, and finally the cross price effect between the conspicuous goods and 
the inconspicuous good. 
Corneo and Jeanne (1997) study own price effect. Their results are that 
under the conformist consumer assumption, an upward sloping demand curve 
of the conspicuous good may arise; while under the snobbish consumer as-
sumption, the demand curve of the conspicuous good is necessarily downward 
sloping. Corneo and Jeanne (1997) cannot study cross price effect because 
there is only one conspicuous good in their model. 
In contrast with Corneo and Jeanne (1997), our results show that under 
the conformist consumer assumption, some cases always give rise to down-
ward sloping demand for Good B; while under the snobbish consumer as-
sumption, some cases give rise to upward sloping demands for both goods. 
According to Corneo and Jeanne (1997), the definitions of snobbish con-
sumer behavior and conformist consumer behavior are simply cr'(n) < 0 and 
cr'(n) > 0 respectively. We extend their concepts of snobbish and conformist 
to our model, as follows: 
Intuitively, the consumer behavior is conformist if the signalling value 
increases with the number of consumers. 
Definition 3 Formally, consumer is conformist if: 
2) ^ ^ ^ > 0 and 
3) ^ ^ ^ < 0 . 
When a increases, the number of consumers for good A decreases. So 
when a increases, b) decreases, i.e. < 0, this satisfies the concept 
of conformist. Similarly, when b increases, the number of consumers for 
good A increases. So when b increases, SU(a’6) increases, i .e .朋當力)> 0, 
this satisfies the concept of conformist. When b increases, the number of 
consumers for good B decreases. So when b increases, 6) decreases, i.e. 
肪當力)< 0, this satisfies the concept of conformist. 
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Similarly, the consumer behavior is snobbish if the signalling value de-
creases with the number of consumers. 
Definition 4 Formally, consumer is snobbish if: 
" 华 〉 0 ， 
2) ^ ^ ^ < 0 and 
3) ^ ^ ^ > 0. 
When a increases, the number of consumers for good A decreases. So 
when a increases, <SA(a，b) increases, i.e. ^ ^ ^ ^ > 0, this satisfies the concept 
of snobbish. Similarly, when b increases, the number of consumers for good 
A increases. So when b increases, SA{a,b) decreases, i . e . 山 ) < •’ this 
satisfies the concept of snobbish. When b increases, the number of consumers 
for good B decreases. So when b increases, b) increases, i . e .肪力 ) > 0, 
this satisfies the concept of snobbish. 
The above two definitions are generalization of Corneo and Jeanne (1997) 
concept of conformist and snobbish. 
We want to point out that in our general definition of snobbish and con-
formist, we do not have any restrictions on dSs/da. 
Now, we will carry out comparative static analysis and investigate the 
own price effect and the cross price effect of the two conspicuous goods and 
the cross price effect on the demand of the inconspicuous good. And we will 
state the required conditions for an upward sloping demand curve to arise. 
Comparative static analysis: 
In order to derive the exact relation of a change in prices on the demands 
of Good A and Good B, we will carry out the comparative static analysis. 
We make use of a change in prices on the equilibrium a* and b* to derive a 
change in prices on the demands of Good A and Good B. 
By taking total derivatives on equilibrium equations (68), i.e. 
SU(a, b) + U{YA 一 PA) == 
5b(a, b) + U{YB — PB) = U(YB - PA) 
we can get the partial effect of a change in the price of Good A on equilibrium 
a* and b* and a change in the price of Good B on equilibrium a* and b*. 
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Taking the total derivatives, we obtain: 
+ — PA) - + ^ D B = U'{YA — P^PA 
譬da + (警 + - PB) - n'{y, - (76) 
= - u ' i V b 一 PA)dPA + u'ivb — PB)dPB. 
Define 
I T| — Jl2 
…=J21 J22 
二 ( 尝 + - P A ) - 爛 i 、 . ( 警 + 帅B - PB) - U'(y, 一 P.))|) 
""OSa dSs 
We assume \ J\ ^ 0. 
The economic interpretation of the terms in J : 
The effect of a change in a can be decomposed into three parts. A 
change in a will affect the signalling value of Good A. It will also affect 
the marginal utility of the critical consumer with the purchase of Good 
A. It will also affect the marginal utility of the critical consumer with 
no purchase of conspicuous goods. 
2. 
= ^ + iu'iyb — PB) — Ayb — PA))盖. 
The effect of a change in b can be decomposed into three parts. A 
change in b will affect the signalling value of Good B. It will also affect 
the marginal utility of the critical consumer with the purchase of Good 
A. It will also affect the marginal utility of the critical consumer with 
the purchase of Good B. 
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3. The term J u = dSA/db measures the partial effect of a change in b on 
SA-
4. The term J21 = dSs/da measures the partial effect of a change in a on 
SB. 
Intuitively, when J21 < 0’ we have the case of externality-complement. 
As J21 < 0, an increase in a causes a decrease in SB- AS a increases, 
the number of consumers buying Good A will decrease and at the same 
time there is a decrease in the signalling value of Good B. 
When J21 > 0, we have the case of externality-substitute. As J21 > 0, 
an increase in a causes an increase in SB. AS a increases, the number 
of consumers buying Good A will decrease and at the same time there 
is an increase in the signalling value of Good B. 
The results of the comparative static analysis depend on the sign of \ J\. 
We provide sufficient conditions for \ J\ > 0 or \ J\ < 0. 
Sufficient conditions for \ J\ > 0; 
Any one of the following conditions ensures \ J\ > 0. 
1. Jii and J22 have the same sign, while J u and J21 have alternating signs. 
2. If the product of J n and J22, and the product of J12 and J21, are both 
positive. Then we need to have J11J22 > J12力i. 
3. If the product of J n and J22, and the product of J12 and J21, are both 
negative. Then we need to have | J n J22 I < |<7i2如丨• 
Sufficient conditions for \ J\ < 0; 
Any one of the following conditions ensures \J\ < 0 . 
1. J12 and J21 have the same sign, while J n and J22 have alternating signs. 
2. If the product of J n and J22, and the product of J12 and J21, are both 
positive. Then we need to have JnJ22 < JuJ^i-
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3. If the product of J n and J22, and the product of J u and J21, are both 
negative. Then we need to have | J u J22I > 
The detailed form of the partials: 
U'IVA - P A ) 營 , 
da 年 - u ' j y , - P A ) 警 + {u'jy, - PB) _ AYB — PA))^, 
两 = \ J \ 
U'IVA - PA){^ + {u'(y, — PB) _ U'{y, - PA))^,) + n'{y, - PA)^ 
\ J \ • 
(77) 
勢 + {u'iVa - PA) - U'IVA _ PA) 
db* 赞 -^'iVb - PA) 
两 = “ 
-u'jyu - Pa){^ + - PA) — n'{ya))fj — AY�— Pa)徵 
m • 
(78) 
n 幽 U db , 
DA* _ Ay, -PB) ^ + {u'jyb - PB) 一 Ayb 一 PA))| 
=—u' iM - PB)樂 (79) 
- • 
'-t + {Aya-PA)-u'(ya)yi 0 
db* ^ U'JYB - PB) 
两 = \ J \ 
_ u'(y, - PB)帶 + (U'(YA - PA) — N'{YA))T) _ 
二 \ J \ • 
72 
Own price effect: 
The own price effect of Good A: 
dn\ _ _ 加* 
-u'{y, - PA){{'-t + i^yg - Pa) - 盒)+ 營） 
= \ J \ 
AY A — PA)(^ + + [u'{y, - PB) - AYB — PA))祭)） 
\ J \ ‘ 
(81) 
The own price effect of Good B: 
dn*B _ db* 
- Psr-t + Wya - PA) _ “⑷ )盒 ) 、叫 
m • 
Cross price effect: 
The effect of a change in PB on the demand of Good A is given by: 
！ — ! 二 -u'{y, — P B ) { ^ + ^  + (U'JYQ - PA) 一 Aya)�t) (§3) 
両 — 两 二 “ W . 
Intuitively, Good A is a substitute for Good B if we get a negative sign 
for da*/dPB - db^/dPs- In other words, Good A is a substitute for Good B 
if we get a positive sign for duA/dPB-
Intuitively, Good A is a complement for Good B if we get a positive sign 
for da*/OPB — db^/dPs- In other words, Good A is a complement for Good 
B if we get a negative sign for dnA/dPs-
The effect of a change in PA on the demand of Good B is given by: 
db* - u \ y , - PA)[樂 + {U'IYG - PA) _ 収 盒 ） — A Y ^ — PA)^ 
兩 二 w\ • 
(84) 
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Intuitively, Good B is a substitute for Good A if we get a negative sign 
for dh*IdPA- In other words, Good B is a substitute for Good A if we get a 
positive sign for dns/dPA-
Intuitively, Good B is a complement for Good A if we get a positive sign 
for dh*IdPA. In other words, Good B is a complement for Good A if we get 
a negative sign for duB/dPA-
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Investigation of own price effect: 
Now, we will study the slope of the demand curves to see whether it is 
easier or more difficult to get an upward sloping demand curve in contrast 
to that of Corneo and Jeanne (1997). 
By equation (81) and (82), we can see that the slopes of the demands of 
Good A and Good B depend on the signs of J n , J22, J12 and J21. So varying 
Ji i , J22, J12 and J21 may vary the signs of the slopes for the demands of Good 
A and Good B. We can observe that it is easier to get a definite slope for 
Good B than for Good A. It is because the slope for the demand of Good B 
only depends on the sign of the Jacobian and ^ + (U'(YA — PA) — U'IVA))^, 
whereas, the slope for the demand of Good A depends on a more complicated 
term. 
We have sixteen different combinations of the signs of J n , J22, J12 and 
For convenience and clarity, we will express each combination in a tuple 
of four elements. The details of the sixteen cases are given in Appendix. 
( J n , J12, J21, J22) Slope of A Slope of B 
~( I ) ( + ’ + ’ + ’ + ) + if | J | < 0 + if IJ| < 0 , _ if | J | > 0 
(2) ( - , - , - , - ) + if I J | > 0 + i f | J | � 0 ，一 if | J | < 0 
(3) ( +’+ , +， _ ) + (on condition) + 
(4) (+’+，_’+) + (on condition) — 
(5) (+，—,+，+) + (on condition) — 
(6) (—’+,+’+) + (on condition) — 
(7) (+’—，-,—) + (on condition) + 
(8) (_’+,—’ 一） + (on condition) + 
(9) (— _ +’ 一） + (on condition) + 
(10) (—’_’—，+) + (on condition) — 
(11) (+，+, - ’ - ) + (on condition) + if | J | < 0 , - if \J\ > 0 
(12) (+, _，+’ - ) + (on condition) + if | J | < 0 , - if | J | > 0 
(13) (+, —, _ , +) + (on condition) + if | J | < 0 , - if \ J\ > 0 
(14) ( - , +’ + , —） + (on condition) + if | J | > 0 , - if | J | < 0 
(15) ( - , — ’ +，+) + (on condition) + if | J | > 0 , - if \J\ < 0 
(16) (_，+’—，+5 + (on condition) | + if | j j � 0 , _ if 丨 j j < 0 
Table 1: Summary of the signs for the slopes of the demands of Good A and 
Good B. 
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According to our Definitions 3 and 4 of the snobbish and conformist, we 
group those cases into snobbish and conformist consumer behaviors. 
Conformist: By our Definition 3’ eight cases will arise for the conformist: 
1. case (1) : ( + , + ’ + , + ) , 
2. case (3) : (+’+,+’_)， 
3. case (4) : ( + , + , - , + ) , 
4. case (6) : (—’+,+’+)’ 
5. case (8) : (—，+,—’—)， 
6. case (11) : (+’ +’ — ’ - ) ’ 
7. case (14) : (—’+，+’-)’ 
8. case (16) : (—,+,—’+). 
With conformist consumer behavior, we have dSA/da < 0. So J n is the 
sum of a positive term and a negative term. Thus Jn may take positive or 
negative signs. 
Similarly, with conformist consumer behavior, we have dSs/db < 0. So 
J22 is the sum of a positive term and a negative term. Thus J22 may take 
positive or negative signs. 
In the above eight cases for the conformist consumer behavior, two cases, 
case (4) and case (6), always give rise to a downward sloping demand curve 
for Good B. 
Thus, we obtain: 
Proposition 9 Under conformist consumer behavior, there exist some cases 
that always give rise to a downward sloping demand curve for conspicuous 
Good B. 
Snobbish: By our Definition 4, two cases will arise for the snobbish: 
1. case (5) : (+, —’ +, +)， 
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2. case (13) ： (+，-’-，+). 
Case (5) may generate an upward sloping demand curve for Good A. Case 
(13) may generate upward sloping demand curves for both goods. These two 
cases which satisfy the snobbish consumer behavior but may generate upward 
sloping demand curves. 
Thus, we obtain: 
Proposit ion 10 Under snobbish consumer behavior, the slopes of the de-
mand curves for both conspicuous goods are not necessarily downward slop-
ing. 
Thus, our result is different from Corneo and Jeanne (1997). In Propo-
sition 3 of Corneo and Jeanne (1997), they show that the demand curve 
must be downward sloping for snobbish consumer behavior in one conspicu-
ous good. We now show that for snobbish consumer behavior, the slopes of 
the demand curves for both goods are not necessarily downward sloping in 
two conspicuous goods context. Therefore, our result also differs from their 
Proposition 4, which states that if the demand curve is upward sloping, then 
the consumer behavior is conformist. We can have upward sloping demand 
curve for both kinds of consumer behaviors in our two conspicuous goods 
context. 
77 
Investigation of cross price effect: 
Since we have two conspicuous goods, we can investigate the cross price 
effect to see whether Good A and Good B are substitutes or complements 
of each other. The details of the sixteen cases for the cross price effects are 
given in Appendix. 
(Jii , Ji2, J21, J22) Effect of Pb on A I Effect of PA on B 
I T ) ( + ’ + ’ + , + ) + i f \ J \ > 0 + if \J\ > 0 
(2) ( - , _ , - , - ) + if I J | < 0 + if I J | < 0 
(3) ( + , + , + , - ) - -
(4) (+’+，—，+) + + (on condition) 
(5) (+’-’+，+) + (on condition) + 
(6) ( _ ’ + , + ’ + ) + (on condition) + (on condition) 
(7) (+’一，一’一） + (on condition) + (on condition) 
(8) (—,+,—’—） + (on condition) — 
(9) (—，—,+，—） — + (on condition) 
(10) ( - , - , - , + ) + + 
(11) (+, +’ 一，-) + if I J | � 0 + (on condition) 
(12) (+, —, + , - ) + (on condition) + if \J\ > 0 
(13) (+’一，一，+) + (on condition) + (on condition) 
(14) (一，+’+，_) + (on condition) + (on condition) 
(15) ( - , _，+, +) + if I J | < 0 + (on condition) 
(16) ( - , + , —, +) + (on condition) + if \ J\ < 0 
Table 2: Summary of the signs of the cross price effects. 
We will study case (3) and case (10) since the signs are definite for both 
goods. 
For case (3)，since the partials dn*JdPB and dn^e/dPA are both negative, 
it means that Good A and Good B are complements of each other. 
For case (10), since the partials dn*JdPB and dn^/dPA are both positive, 
it means that Good A and Good B are substitutes of each other. 
Thus, we obtain: 
Proposi t ion 11 The partial derivatives dn*JdPB and 371*^1 dPA may be 
positive or negative. 
The substitution effect on the inconspicuous Good C: 
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To study the substitution effect on the inconspicuous Good C, we will 
look into the partials 
doT ^ da* 
and Ws' 
In the following, we will just state the cases that have definite signs for 
da*/dPA or da^/dPe. 
Recall Equation (77) that da* jdPA depends on the signs of J12, J22 and 
|J | . 
Cases (4) and (7) will give rise to a positive da”dPA. That means an 
increase in PA will lead to an increase in the demand of the inconspicuous 
good. 
Cases (6) and (9) will give rise to a negative da*IdPA- That means an 
increase in PA will lead to a decrease in the demand of the inconspicuous 
good. 
Recall Equation (79) that da*/dPB only depends on the signs of J12 and 
| J | . 
Cases (3), (5), (6) and (9) will give rise to a positive da^/dPn- That means 
an increase in Pb will lead to an increase in the demand of the inconspicuous 
good for these cases. 
Cases (4), (7), (8) and (10) will give rise to a negative da*/dPB. That 
means an increase in PB will lead to a decrease in the demand of the incon-
spicuous good for these cases. 
Therefore, cases (6) and (9) have a negative da*/dPA but a positive 
da*ldPB\ while cases (4) and (7) have a positive da*jdPa but a negative 
da”dPB. 
Thus, we obtain: 
Proposi t ion 12 Changes in the prices of conspicuous Good A and Good 
B in the same direction may have opposite effects on the demand of the 
inconspicuous Good C. 
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3.3.4 Welfare implication 
We assume that the conspicuous Goods A and B are competitively supplied 
at their marginal costs, 7a and 75 respectively, where 7a < 7b- We study the 
question whether prohibition of conspicuous goods improves social welfare. 
We will consider three ways of prohibition of conspicuous goods. 
1. Society with conspicuous goods A and B (A & B) to society with no 
conspicuous goods (0). 
2. Society with conspicuous goods A and B (A & B) to society with only 
conspicuous good B (B). 
3. Society with conspicuous goods A and B (A & B) to society with only 
conspicuous good A (A). 
Our results are: 
(Case 1) Prohibition of both conspicuous goods improves social 
welfare and may be Pareto improving. 
(Cases 2 and 3) Prohibition of only one conspicuous good depends 
on some conditions for social welfare to be raised and can never 
be Pareto improving. 
1. Switching from no prohibition at all to the prohibition of both goods, 
i.e. from (A & B) to (0): 
Social Welfare Analysis: 
The social welfare for consumption of both conspicuous goods is: 
SW = r u{yr)dr^ [ u{yr--fA)dr-\- [ u(yriB)dr+ f R{r)dr. 
Jo Ja* Jh* JO 
The social welfare for prohibition of both conspicuous goods is: 
SW= [ u(yr)dr + [ R(r)dr. 
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It is easily seen that 
SW' < SW. 
We show that the social welfare for consumption of both conspicuous 
goods (SW) is smaller than the social welfare for prohibition of both 
conspicuous goods (SW). So, prohibition of both conspicuous goods 
improves social welfare. This result is similar to Proposition 5 of Corneo 
and Jeanne (1997). 
Individual Analysis: 
The conditions for Pareto-optimal to prohibit both conspicuous goods: 
For individuals r G [0,a*], prohibition of both conspicuous goods does 
not affect their consumption of numeraire good but raises their rank 
utilities. So, these individuals are better off. 
For individuals r e [a\b*], their utility change is: 
U{YR - 7 A ) + J : — < Y R � - J : ( 8 5 ) 
For these individuals to be better off requires (85) to be less than 0. 
All individuals r G [a\ 6*] are better off if the following holds: 
广 A ^ d i 一 � R { i ) d i < u{yb*) — u(y,* - 7A). (86) 
J a* b*-a* Jo 
From the inequality (86), we can see that if the loss in signalling value 
from prohibition is less than the utility gain in consumption of the 
numeraire for individual 6*, then all individuals r G [a*,b*] are better 
off. It is because b* is the richest individual among those who consume 
Good A, and u(-) is a concave function. If 6* satisfies the inequality 
(86), then for those r G [a\b*), 
U{YR) - U{YR - 7 A ) > U ( Y B * ) — 如 _ 7 A ) > J^^ 由 _ J � 丑 � 也 • 
For individuals r G [b\l], their utility change is: 
厂 1 R ( i ) 
uiyr - 7 b ) + / T ^ d i 一 u{yr) 一 / R{i)di. (87) 
Jb* 丄一0 Jo 
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For these individuals to be better off requires (87) to be less than 0. 
All individuals r e [6*, 1] are better off if the following holds: 
� - C R{i)di < u{y,) — - 7B). (88) 
Jb* 1 - 0 * Jo 
It is because individual 1 is the richest individual among those who 
consume Good B. If individual 1 satisfies the inequality (88)，then for 
those r G 
u(yr) - u(yr - 7b) > u{yi) - u{yi - 7b) > 人 出 _ J^ 耶)议 
Our results are similar to that of Corneo and Jeanne (1997). But we 
are considering the society with two conspicuous goods, to be Pareto 
improving, it needs to satisfy two conditions (86) and (88). 
Thus, we obtain: 
Proposit ion 13 Switching from a society with two conspicuous goods 
(A & B) to a society with no conspicuous good(0) improves social wel-
fare. It is Pareto improving if loss in signalling value is sufficiently 
low. 
2. Switching from no prohibition at all to the prohibition of only Good A, 
i.e. from (A & B) to (B): 
Social welfare analysis: 
The social welfare for prohibition of only Good A is: 
SWB 二 [ U{yr)DR + f U(YR - jB)DR + f R{r)dr. 
Jo Jb' Jo 
We see that after the prohibition of Good A, some consumers will switch 
to consume Good B. So, the total number of consumers for Good B 
will increase. Thus there is a new equilibrium b' different from that of 
b. 
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To compare SWB and SW, we can further break down SWB into 
smaller parts for easier comparison with SW. 
ra* rb' rb* 
S W B = / u{yr)dr + / u{yr)DR + / U(YR - lB)DR 
Jo J a* Jb' 1 
+ / u{yr - jB)dr + / R{r)dr. 
Jb* 
Refer back to S W , 
SW' = jo u�yr�dr + Ja u{yr-lA)dr +u{yr-iB)dr + J^ R{r)dr, 
we can see that the second term J^l • — ^A)dr in SW can be de-
composed into 
fb' 产 
J uivr - -fA)dr + Jb, u(yr - ^A)dr. 
Condition for SWB > SW: 
Prohibiting only Good A is socially more preferable 
rb' rb' rb* fb* 
/ u{yr)dr- / u{yr-lA)dr > / u{yr-7A)dr- J , u{yriB�dr. 
a* ‘‘ ‘ (89) 
Individual analysis: 
For individuals r G [0, a% they are better off with higher rank utilities. 
For individuals r e [a*, 6'], i.e. those who switch from the consumption 
of Good A to no consumption of conspicuous good, they will be better 
off if: 
pb* R � pb'丑⑷ 
uiVr - 7A) + 人 - uiVr) _ J � — d i < 0. 
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Substituting r = b' into the above inequality and rearranging, we ob-
tain: 
r T ^ d i — [b 婴di < u(yb') 一 u(w — 7A). (90) 
人.b* - a* Jo b' 
If the inequality (90) holds, then it is guaranteed that all individuals 
r e [a\b'] will be better off. 
For individuals r G 6*], i.e. those who switch from the consumption 
of Good A to the consumption of Good B, they will be better off if: 
uiVr — IA) + L - • - - L f ^ d i < 0. 
Substituting r = b' into the above inequality and rearranging, we ob-
tain: 
� - ^ d i — r r ^ R F I > U{y, - 7 A ) - u { y , — 7 B ) . ( 9 1 ) 
If the inequality (91) holds, then it is guaranteed that all individuals 
r G b*] will be better off. 
For individuals r e [6*, 1], they will always be worse off as their sig-
nalling utilities are lowered by those consumers who now purchase Good 
B but previously purchased Good A. 
We have shown that switching from (A k B) to (B) improves social 
welfare if the inequality (89) is satisfied. In other words, banning the 
sale of the less expensive conspicuous good may worsen social welfare. 
Thus, we obtain: 
Proposition 14 Switching from a society with two conspicuous goods 
(A & B) to a society with only one conspicuous Good B (the more 
expensive one), improves the social welfare if and only if the inequality 
(89) is satisfied. However, it can never be Pareto improving since those 
individuals r G [b\l], who purchase Good B in society (A & B), are 
always worse o f f . 
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3. Switching from no prohibition at all to the prohibition of only Good B, 
i.e. from (A & B) to (A): 
Social welfare analysis: 
The social welfare for prohibition of only Good B is: 
S W a = f u{yr)dr + [ u{yr - -fA)dr + f R(r)dr. 
Jo J a' Jo 
The prohibition of only Good B leads all those who previously con-
sumed Good B to consume Good A. The new equilibrium a' is lower 
than a* since the signalling value in consuming Good A is raised by 
more high income consumers. 
丄o compare SWA and SW, we can further break down SWA into 
smaller parts for easier comparison with SW. 
ra' ra* fb* 
SWA = J u{yr)dr + J u{yr - LA)dr + J * u(yr - IA)dr 
+ f u{yr - lA)dr + f R{r)dr. 
Jb* JO 
Refer back to SW, 
SW =厂 u{yr)dr+ [ u{yr-jA)dr+ f u{yrlB)dr+ f R{r)dr, 
Jq Ja* Jb* Jo 
we can see that the first term j f u{yr)dr in SW can be decomposed 
into , 严 
/ u(yr)dr + / u{yr)dr. 
Jo J a' 
Condition for SWA > SW: 
Prohibiting only Good B is socially more preferable 
r u{yr)dr- [ u[yr-lA)dr< [ u{yr-^A)dr- f u{yr-^B)dr. 




For individuals r G [6*, 1], i.e. those who switch from the consumption 
of Good B to the consumption of Good A, they will be better off if: 
u{yr — 7B) + 丄 Y ^ ^ ^ - <yr — 7A) - L, 也 < 0. 
Substituting r 二 1 into the above inequality and rearranging, we ob-
tain: 
r • ^ d i —广興di < u(y, - JA) - u{yi - IB). (93) 
Jb* 1 - J a' 1 - a' 
If the inequality (93) holds, then it is guaranteed that all individuals 
r G [b\ 1] will be better off. 
For individuals r G [a%b*], they will be better off if: 
Ja' 1 — a' Ja* b* — a* 
For individuals r G [a',a*], i.e. those who switch from no consumption 
of conspicuous goods to the consumption of Good A, they will be better 
off if: 
u(yr) + r — d i — u(yr - 7A) - r ^ d i < 0. 
Jo a « /a '丄" • 
Substituting r = 1 into the above inequality and rearranging, we ob-
tain: 
广 歷 d i 一 r 玛di > u{ya>) - u{ya' - 7A). (94) 
Ja' 1 - Jo a* 
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If the inequality (94) holds, then it is guaranteed that all individuals 
r e [a', a*] will be better off. 
For individuals r G [0, a'] will always be worse off as their expected 
rank utility is lowered as more consumers switch from no consumption 
of conspicuous goods to consume Good A. 
We have shown that switching from (A k B) to (A) improves social 
welfare if the inequality (92) is satisfied. In other words, banning the 
sale of the more expensive conspicuous good may reduce social welfare. 
Thus, we obtain: 
Proposition 15 Switching from a society with two conspicuous goods 
(A & B) to a society with only one conspicuous Good A (the cheaper 
one), improves the social welfare if and only if the inequality (92) is 
satisfied. However, it can never be Pareto improving since those indi-
viduals r e [0, a']，who do not purchase in both situations, are always 
worse o f f . 
To summarize, prohibition of both conspicuous goods improves social 
welfare and may be Pareto improving. 
Prohibition of only one conspicuous good depends on some conditions for 
social welfare to be raised and can never be Pareto improving. 
3.4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we follow Corneo and Jeanne (1997) to study conspicuous goods 
by signalling values. We extend their model to allow a multiple signalling 
goods (rather than one) model. We develop new equilibrium concepts to 
determine the demands of the conspicuous goods. The demands of the two 
conspicuous goods are simultaneously determined. We investigate the own 
price effects and cross price effects. 
Corneo and Jeanne (1997) prove that if the consumer behavior is snob-
bish, then the demand of the conspicuous good is always downward sloping. 
If the demand function of the conspicuous good is upward sloping, then the 
consumer behavior is conformist. The converse is not necessarily true. 
In contrast to the results of Corneo and Jeanne, our results show that 
under snobbish consumer behavior, some cases give rise to upward sloping 
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demand curves for both goods. Under conformist consumer behavior, some 
cases always give rise to a downward sloping demand curve for Good B. 
In Corneo and Jeanne (1997) paper, there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the signalling value and the rank utility function. However, in our 
model of two conspicuous goods, given any signalling values, the rank utility 
function may not exist. And we show that if the signalling values satisfy 
our three consistency requirements, then they are generated by a rank utility 
function. 
Finally, we carry out welfare analysis on the prohibition of conspicuous 
goods. We show that prohibiting both conspicuous goods improves social 
welfare but whether prohibiting only one conspicuous good improves social 
welfare depends on some conditions. 
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3.5 Appendix 
3.5.1 Proofs of our Lemmas 
Proof of Lemma 5: 
Otherwise, 
丑 二 二 1]. 
Then for any r G IB, buying A not buying B is affordable because PA < PB, 
and will be better off. So r e IB cannot be the equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 6: 
We define 
5 A = E[R{T)\5^ = 1] — E[R[T)\5^ = OA丑=0]， 
SB = E[R(r)\6^ = 1] - E[R{r)\S：^ = 1]. 
Clearly, r e Ia implies 
U{YR - PA) SA> U{YR) and YR < PB, 
or 
U{yr - PA) ^ S A > and • - PA) > u{yr - PB) + SB. 
For r' > r, y— > yr. Since u(-) is a concave function, > u{yr'). 
So Agent r' will be better off from buying Good A than not purchasing any. 
Next, if Agent r' has income greater than PB, then Agent r' will consider 
whether to buy Good B. He will buy Good B if and only if U{YR> - PA) _ 
u{yr' — P B ) < S B . 
Let YR' = YR + E, where e > 0. Then U{YR> - PA) — U{YR' — PB) becomes 
u{yr + e - PA) - U{yr + e — PB), which is decreasing with e because u(-) is a 
concave function. 
Since u(yr - PA) — U(YR — PB) > SB�and also by Lemma 5，E[R{r)\6：^ = 
1] < 丑 = 1], which implies SB > 0, there exists an e' such that 
U{YR + — PA) - U{YR + — PB) = SB- And thus agent with income higher 
than yr + e' will buy B. So, Agent r ' will buy A if his income is smaller than 
yr + e'. And he will buy B if his income is greater than yr + 
Therefore, if r G I A, Vr' > Vr, then r ' G U IB- Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 7: Similar to that of Lemma 6. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 8: Similar to that of Lemma 6. Q.E.D. 
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3.5.2 Proof of the derivation of SB, SA, RI and R2 
SB{a,b) 
= j f 眷-(")r 释丨 
- ( 6 - a) j : R{r)dr + ( l - a ) ( 6 - a ) ^ - ^ c ^ r ) ] 
= u L — … r 风一 + …一] 
(1 - b){b - a) Ja 
= ( 一 ⑷ - r 释 1 
Similarly, 
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b) = [b R{r)dr - {b - a) [ R{T)dr] 
a[b - a) Ja Jo 
I Rir)dr + b{b-a){-^ 义 R(r)dr + ^ 丄 R(r)dr)] 
= ^ ^ ^ [ a J : R{T)dr — b(h - a) J : 罕 d r + (b - a) j : H(r)dr)l 
= - j T ^ A b r 风 o d r - (b - 所叫 
a{b - a) Ja 
= ^^l['Rir)dr-{b-a)R{b)] 
a{b - a) Ja 
= - 7 / - T / V W — a{b - a) Ja 
T h e derivation of R^{r) from Ssia^b): 
+ V — _ —a)p j严⑷—则 ] d r 
_ 二 及 ⑷ — i l z ^ } ^ 轨 — 
R \ T ) = 凤 a) — ( I — I ” ) (卜 — for r e [a,l]. 
\ ' I — a U _ a) 
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The derived R^{r) can give rise to our R{a): 
j ^ J : R � r ) d r 
=Th [ 春 - i h L � ^ ^ ^ 嘛 r ) + 殺 她 , • 
=及⑷—(T^^ J�去(1 一 - -)SB{a.r)]dr 
=R(a) — (1 二)2丨(1 - - a)•^召(a’ 
=R{a). 
The derivation of from &)： 
藝 , = & + 綱 + w^ -
队 (a , b) = 6) + ^ [ - ⑷ + 糊 ] 
a(b - a)daSA{a, 6) = — - 2a)5^(a, b) + b[-R{a) + R(b)] 
bR(a) 二 bR{J)) + (2a — &)SU(a，b) - a{b - a)daSA[a, b) 
R'{r) = _ + b) - ^-^^^daSAir. b) for r e [0, b]. 
The derived R"\r) can give rise to our R{b): 




3.5.3 Examples about unobserved rank utility functions 
A specific example that has unobserved rank utility function: 
If the rank utility function is 
R(r) 二 r, 
we can derive the signalling values <SA(a’&) and SB(a,b): 
她 ， — 占 — 4 ( 1 — a). 
Checking for the fulfilment of the first consistency requirement, we first 
find T\r) and T^M： 
T\r) 
=- ( l — ^ ^ a W + r ) -
a + 1 - 2r 
= 2 ’ 
T \ T ) 






Then, we take the difference between T^(r) and T^M： 
a + 1 - 2r 2r-b 
= 一 — — ^ ― 一 — 
2 2 
- g - 1 + 2r - 2r + 6 
= 2 
b — I — a 
= ~ 2 • 
We then find R{b) and R{a): 
m =書， 
= 宇 
Taking the difference between R{b) and R{a): 
R{b) — R{a) = = = T\r) - T^(r) Vr E (a, 6). 
We show that T^(r)-T'^{r) = R{b)-R{a). Therefore, the first consistency 
requirement is satisfied. 
Checking for the fulfilment of the second consistency requirement, we take 
the difference between T\a,r) and T\a',r): 
T\a,r)-T\a\r) 
a + 1 — 2r a' + 1 - 2r 
= 2 + 2 
—a — 1 + 2r + + 1 - 2r 
二 
—a + a' 
= ~ 2 ~ ' 
Then we take the difference between R{a') and R{a)\ 
R{a') — R{a) 
_ 1 + a' 1 + a 
= Z ^ = r i ( a , r ) - T V ’ r ) . 
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We show that T\a,r) — T^(a',r) 二 R{a'�— R{a). Therefore, the second 
consistency requirement is satisfied. 
Checking for the fulfilment of the third consistency requirement, we take 
the difference between b) and 6'): 
_2r-b _ 2r-b' 
2r-b-2r + b' 
= 2 
— b'-b 
= 丁 • 
Then we take the difference between R(b') and R(b): 
R{b') 一 R{b) 
b' b 
= — 一 — 
2 2 
We show that b) — T\r,b') = R(b') — R{b). Therefore, the third 
consistency requirement is satisfied. 
All consistency requirements are satisfied because the signalling values SA 
and SB are generated consistently by one rank utility function, i.e. R(r) = r. 
An example of signalling values SA, SB that do not have any unobserved 
rank utility function: 
5U(a’6) = 
1 - b 
Checking for the fulfilment of the first consistency requirement, we first 
find T\r) and T'^{r): 
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T\r) 
( l - r ) ( r - a ) _ ^ , � a + 1 - 2r 
= - - - d b S s i a ^ r ) — — - — — 咖’ r) 
I — a [I — a) 
- — ( 1 — Q (卜 a ) r l � _ Q + 
= r ^ ( T ) _ (1 —a) 
—4r + 2 a r - 2 a — 1 -
= 2 ( 1 — a ) ‘ 
_2r - b b - r r{b - r) . 1, 
b 卜 3) 
46r - 3r~2 -
= 36 • 
Then, we take the difference between T^(r) and T^(r): 
T\r)-T'{r) 
4r + 2ar - 2a - 1 - _ 46r - - 9 
二 2 ( 1 - a ) ^ 
(46 + Uah)r + (6 - 6a - 96)r^ + (26^ - 2a9 - 3 6 - 6a6) 
= “ 6 6 ( 1 - a) 
• constant. ( ••• The expression still varies with r.) 
The signalling values fail the consistency requirement. Therefore, this 
example of signaling values do not have a corresponding unobserved rank 
utility function. 
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3.5.4 Proofs of Propositions 7 and 8 
Proof of Proposition 7 _ 
Given 5a(a, 1) and ^(1), R^{r) for r G [0’ Ij can be derived by Equation 
(72). So, R'^{r) can be used to find R{a) and R{b). 
By the first consistency requirement, = for r e [a, 1]. Sub-
stituting r = 1, Ssia, 1) can be found. 
By the second consistency requirement, 二 /?i(a'’r) = R'^{r) for 
r e [a, 1]. 5b (a, b) can be found such that it is consistent with <Ss(a’ 1). 
By the third consistency requirement, b) = E?{r, h') = B?{r) for 
r e [0,6]. (a, 6) can be found such that it is consistent with the given 
5^(a , l ) . Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 8 
Given 5a(a, 1) and ^(1), R'^{r) for r G [0，1] can be derived. By Equation 
(67), SA(a,b) and 6) can be derived using R'^{r) for r G [0,1]. Since 
the unique rank utility function B?{r) is used to derive the signalling values, 
the first consistency requirement is automatically satisfied. Also, B?{r) is 
independent of a. Therefore, the second consistency requirement is satisfied. 
Also, the derived R^(r) is independent of b. Therefore, the third consistency 
requirement is satisfied. Q.E.D. 
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3.5.5 Illustration of Propositions 7 and 8 by examples 
Illustration of Proposition 7 by a specific example: 
Given: 
5A(a, 1) = and ^(1) = 0. 
o 
By the given 5a(a, 1), ^(1) and Equation (72)，we have: 
R ' i r ) = m ) + (2r - l)SA(r, 1) - r ( l - r)daSA(r, 1) 
= ( 2 r - l ) ( i ^ ) - r ( l - r ) ( i ) 
= r ^ - i for r G [0,1；. 
By consistency requirement (1), for r G [a, 1], we have 
— ( l - r ) ( r - a ) 汰拟 a , r) — r) — (r^ - i ) = (95) 
I — a U 一 a) d 
By consistency requirement (2), for r G [a, 1], we have 
- ( 1 - ; ) ( … W ， r ) - + “ - 严 二 
1 — a 丄 i — a 
+ = R{a') — R{a). 
丄 - a ) 
(96) 
By consistency requirement (3)，for r G [0,1], we have 
0 0 0 (97) 
To find 5b(a, 6), we fir_st find R(a) and ^^(a, 1). 
We use to find R{a) by Equation (69). 
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R(a) =�~^R2(r)dr 
Ja 1 — a 
二丄[！：!々 
_ a(l + a) 
By (95), we have: 
二 for r G [a, 1] 
- 職 r) - [a, 1]. 
3 1 — a 丄一a o 
We can derive 5B (a, 1) by the above equation by substituting r = 1，we 
obtain: 
华 - o - H 她 , 1 ) 4 
= (98) 
By (96), we will derive 5B(a,6) function. Since a! is arbitrary, we replace 
a' by a. For r e [a, 1], we also replace r by b. Thus, we have: 
p 丄 华 — ( l - 6 ) ( 6 — � 綱 
3 3 1 — a 
毕 - “ • 去 肩 i l ： ： ^ ) ] 
/ [ 举 - " W i ( 糊 
� 3 ) — y + 3 + C � 二 b)~"“—~ 
� 1 - a ,ab{l + a) b^b 工 
她 ， b ) = (1 a ) ' - V ^ " 3 + 3 + 嚇 
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To obtain the desired Ss(a，b) function, we adjust the constant term from 
integration to satisfy (98). Therefore, 
C^(a) 二 ^―- and 5B(a, 6) • 
To find SA{a,b), we first find R(b). 
_ fb 1 
R{b) = / -R\r)dr 
Jo b 
= V J _ y � 
1 
By (97), we will derive 5a(a, 6) function. Since b' is arbitrary, we replace 
b' by b. For r G [0,1], we also replace r by a. Thus, we have: 
9 1 9 1 , a{h - a) ^ 
o O o 0 ^ 
2 P d L � y - a b � i 
a - T = 石 [ 聊 
O o 
b M^ ab"^ ^ 2 / L M 
_ = 了 + 缝 
To obtain the desired 5A(a, b) function, we adjust the constant term from 
integration to satisfy the given SAO, 1). Therefore, 
C\b) 二 0 and SA{a,b) 二 
Therefore, given SA{a, 1) and 及(1), we can derive SU(a’b) and 5B(a, 6) 
by using the consistency requirements (1), (2) and (3). 
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Illustration of Proposition 8 by a specific example: 
Given 
SA{a, 1) = and 所 1) 二 0. 
o 
By the given 1), ^(1) and Equation (72), we have: 
R\r) = R{1) + (2r — l)SU(r’ 1) — r ( l - 1) 
= (2r 一 1 ) ( 宇 ) - r ( l 一 r)(去） 
= re [0’ 1]. 
0 
By Equation (67), we can find SA{a, b) and <Ss(a’&): 
~ b-ah 3 � � 
1 b^  6 _ ^ a. _ I r ^ 一 a 
= ~ 3 r ~ a ^ y ~ 
二 " T " ' 
1 _ r 1 
^ 1 63 b a3 a 
I 1 
~ l - b ^ 3 3] b - a ^ S 3 3 3 � 
1 + & — a6 — a2 
= 3 • 
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Then we check for the fulfilment of the three consistency requirements: 
Ti(r) — T\r)=签—• — •—菩 = R ( b ) - 及 � ’ 
7>，r) - T\a\r) 二菩+ • — 菩 = _ “及⑷’ 
r2(r, b) - T2(r’ = R{b') — 
Therefore, SA(a,b) and <Ss(a’6) derived satisfy the consistency require-
ment (1)，（2) and (3) with respect to the given SA(a, 1). 
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3.5.6 Proof of Theorem 3 
Proof of Theorem 3, part (1): 
Given and 5^(0,6) which satisfy the three consistency require-
ments, we can easily solve for their partials daSA{r, b) and 汰S"s(a’r). By 
equations (71) and (72)，we have: 
R\r) = R{a)- ^^ " ^ . S B ( a , r ) - ( a , r) for r G [a, 1], 
R'^ir) = R{b) + b) - ！ b ) for r G [0, b]. 
To find the rank utility function R{r) for r G [0’ 1], we make use of the 
fact that SA{a,b) and Ssia^b) satisfy the three consistency requirements. 
Since and 5B(a, 6) satisfy the second consistency requirement, we 
can find the rank utility function R^(r) by restricting R{a). Then by the 
first consistency requirement, R{b) is automatically determined. Thus 
can be obtained by (72). 
'R\r) for r G [6,1] 
R{r) = R\r) = for r G [a, b] 
、丑2 ⑷ forrE[0,a]. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 3, part (2): 
If a rank utility function R{r) is given, we can derive b) and 5s(a , b) 
by using equations (67). Since SU(a’&) and SB{a,b) are derived from a 
unique rank utility function i?(r), they must satisfy the three consistency 
requirements. Q.E.D. 
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3.5.7 Details for own price effects 
The detailed conditions for the signs of the slope for the sixteen cases 
1. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (+, +，+, +)• 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+’ +, +’ +)’ then 丨 J | may be positive or negative 
( | J | � 0 ) . 
By Equation (81), we have: 
， < 0 if and only i f \ J \ > 0， 
O P A 
� 0 if and only if | J | < 0. 
OPA 
This means that the own price effect of Good A is negative if and only 
if \J\ > 0. The own price effect of Good A is positive if and only if 
\J\ < 0 . 
By Equation (82), we have: 
， < 0 if and only i f \ J \ > 0, 
O P B 
Pir)* 
， 〉 0 if and only i f \ J \ < 0. 
O P B 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is negative if and only 
if \J\ > 0. The own price effect of Good B is positive if and only if 
| J | < 0. 
2. Consider the case: (Jii, J12，如’ <^ 22) = (—’—，—，—)• 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) 二 (一’ —，—), then \ J \ may be positive or negative 
By Equation (81), we have: 
^ >Oif and only i f \ J \ > 0’ 
OPA 
， < 0 if and only if | J | < 0. 
dPA 
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This means that the own price effect of Good A is positive if and only 
if I J | > 0. The own price effect of Good A is negative if and only if 
| J | < 0 . 
By Equation (82), we have: 
， 〉 0 if and only if | J | > 0， 
OPB 
^ < 0 if and only if | J | < 0. 
OPB 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive if and only 
if | J | > 0. The own price effect of Good B is negative if and only if 
\J\ < 0. 
3. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+, +，+’ —). 
If (Ji i , J12, J21, J22) = (+’ +’ +, —)’ then IJ| < 0. 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if either of the following holds: 
(a) IJ21I > IJ22I, 
(b) IJ21I < IJ22I and U'IVB — PA){JU + J12) > \U'{YA _ PA){J2I + ^22)1. 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if and only if the following holds: 
IJ21I < IJ22I and U'IYB _ PA)(^11 + J12) < \U'{YA — PA)(J2I + ^22)I• 
By Equation (82), we have: 
dPs 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive. 
4. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, J21’ J22) = (+, +,_’+). 
If ( J n , J12, J21, J22) = (+’ +, - ’ +)，then \J\ > 0. 
By Equation (81), dn \ ldPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if and only if the following holds: 
\u'{ya - PA)J2I\ > u'IVA "尸A)知 + AVb — + «/L2). 
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By Equation (81)，drfJdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if and only if the following holds: 
\u\ya - PA)J2I\ < U'IVA — PA)J22 + AVB - PA^U + J l 2 ) . 
By Equation (82), we have: 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is negative. 
5. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (+’ — ’ +，+)• 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+’ —，+, +)，then\J\ > 0. 
By Equation (81), dn\/dPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if and only if the following holds: 
\u'{yb - PA)JUL > • - PA){J2I + J22) + AVb _ PA)JII 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if and only if the following holds: 
\u'{yb - PA)JUL < AYA 一 PA){J2I + J22) + AW^ — PA)JII 
By Equation (82), we have: 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is negative. 
6. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) 二（_’ +, +，+)• 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (-, +，+, +)’ then | J | < 0. 
By Equation (81), d r f JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if and only if the following holds: 
LU'IVB - PA) JUL < AYA - PA){J2I + J22) + U'IVB 一 PA)JI2-
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By Equation (81), dn*JdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if and only if the following holds: 
\u'{yb — PA)JU\ > U'IVA - PA){J2I + J22) + U'IVB - PA)JI2. 
By Equation (82), we have: 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is negative. 
7. Consider the case: (Jn’ t7i2, J21’ J22) = (+’-，_,—). 
If ( J n , J12, J21, J22) = (+’ -，一 )， t h e n \ J \ < 0. 
By Equation (81), dn^dPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if and only if the following holds: 
u'iVb - PA)JN > WIVA - PA){J21 + ^22)1 + W{Vb " PA)JI2\. 
By Equation (81), drfJdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if and only if the following holds: 
u'ivb - PA)^11 < W I V A - PA){J2I + ^22)I + W'ivb — PA)JI2\-
By Equation (82), we have: 
dPB 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive. 
8. Consider the case: (Jn’ J12, >>^21’ 知）二（—’+’-,—). 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (—，+，— ’ -)，then\J\ > 0. 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if and only if the following holds: 
\u'{yb — PA)Jul + WiVa _ + J22)| > u'ivb - Pa)Ji2. 
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By Equation (81)，drfJdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if and only if the following holds: 
\v!{yb - P a ) i l l I + \u\ya - Pa)(^21 + ^22)! < u'{yb — Pa) J12. 
By Equation (82)，we have: 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive. 
9. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (—, 一’ +，—)• 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = ( — ’ + , -)，then \J\ > 0. 
By Equation (81)，dn*JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if and only if the following holds: 
LU'IVB - PAKJU + Jl2)\ + WIVA — PA)J22\ > AVA _ ^A) J2I. 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if and only if the following holds: 
\'u!{yb - PA){JN + Jl2)\ + WiVa - PA)J22\ < U'iVa - P a ) , 2 1 . 
By Equation (82), we have: 
O P B 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive. • 
10. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (-, +)• 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = ( - ’ +)’ then | J | < 0. 
By Equation (81), d r f JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if and only if the following holds: 
U'iya — PA)J22 > \Y!{YB - PA){JII + Jl2)\ + \U'{ya - PA)J2II 
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By Equation (81)，dn\/dPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if and only if the following holds: 
u'IVA - PA)J22 < \u'{yb - PA)(JN + 如 ) | + WIVA — PA)J21I. 
By Equation (82), we have: 
g < � . 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is negative. 
11. Consider the case: (Jii’ J12’ J21, >^ 22) = (+’+，—，_). 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+’ +’ -， - ) , then \ J \ may be positive or negative 
( | J | � 0 ) . 
By Equation (81), d r f JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 and U'{YA — PA)I^21 + 知 I > AVB —尸A)(JII + J12), 
( b ) I J | < 0 a n d U'IYA - PA)\J2I + ^22! < AVb — PA)[JI\ + J12). 
By Equation (81)，dn\/dPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if either of the following holds: 
(a) | J | > 0 and U'{YA - PA)I^21 + M < AYB - PA){JU + J12), 
( b ) I J | < 0 a n d U'IYA 一 PA)\J2I + M > AYB — PA)(JII + ^12). 
By Equation (82), we have: 
and only if | J | < 0’ 
OPB 
^ < O i f and only i f \ J \ > 0. 
OPB 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive if and only 
if \J\ < 0. The own price effect of Good B is negative if and only if 
\J\ > 0. 
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12. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, ^21, J22) = (+，—，+，—). 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = ( + , + ’ -)，then 丨 J | may be positive or negative 
By Equation (81)，dn*JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if either of the following holds: 
(a) I J | > 0 and U'{YB — + ^ '^fea — PA)\J22\ > U'{YB - PA)JU + 
u'iva - PA) J21, 
(b) I J | < 0 and u'(yb — PaVuI ^ W{va - PA)I^221 < 以'(2/6 — Pa)J i i + 
u'{ya - PA) J2I' 
By Equation (81), drfJdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if either of the following holds: 
(a) I J | > 0 and u\yb _ Pa) I ^ 121 + A y a - Pa)\J22\ < Ayb - PaVi i + 
U'IVA - PA) J21, 
(b) | J | < 0 and u'ivb - P a V u I + u'iva - Pa)\J22\ > - ^ a ) J i i + 
U'iVa - PA) J21-
By Equation (82), we have: 
� � 0 if and only if | J | < 0’ 
OPB 
^ <Oif and only if 丨 J | > 0. 
dPs 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive if and only 
if I J | < 0. The own price effect of Good B is negative if and only if 
\J\ > 0. 
13. Consider the case: (Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+，—，— ’ +). 
If ( Jn , J12, J2I,J22) = (+，一’ - ’ +)’ t h e n \ J \ may be positive or negative 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if either of the following holds： 
(a) |J | > 0 and u'{yb - Pa)\Ji2\ + u'{ya - Pa)\J2i\ > w'O/a — Pa)J22 + 
u'{yb - P A V I I , 
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(b) \J\ < 0 and U'IVB — PA)\JI2\ + AY�— PA)\J2I\ < AVA — Pa)J22 + 
U'IVB — PA)JII-
By Equation (81), d r f JdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if either of the following holds: 
(a) I J | > 0 and u'{yi,-尸A)| J12I + A y � - PA)\J2I\ < Ay A _ PA)J22 + 
u'ivb - PA)JII’ 
( b ) \J\ < 0 a n d U'IVB — PA)\JI2\ + U\YA - PA ) I ^211 > Ay A —尸A) J22 + 
u'{yb - PA)^!!-
By Equation (82)，we have: 
^ > O i f and only i f \ J \ < 0, 
OPB 
fir)* 
^ < O i f and only i f \ J \ > 0. 
OPB 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive if and only 
if \J\ < 0. The own price effect of Good B is negative if and only if 
\J\ > 0. 
14. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, J21： J22) = (-, +, +, -)• 
If ( J n , J12, J21, J22) = (-’ +’ +，-)，then\J\ may be positive or negative 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if either of the following holds: 
(a) | J | � 0 a n d i / ( y 6 — — 尸 > 0 1 知I > u \ y b - P a ) J i 2 + 
u'iya - Pa)J21, 
(b) | J | < 0 and u'ivb - PA)\Jn\ + u'{ya - Pa)|^22| < —PJJ12 + 
u'iya - PA)J21-
By Equation (81), dn \ /dPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 and U'{YB — PA)\JN\+U'{YA — J22I < U'{YI - Pa)^12 + 
u'iva - Pa)J21, 
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(b) I J | < 0 and u'ivb - PA )ki l l + u'{ya - PA)| J22I > u'{yb - Pa)Ji2 + 
u'iVa - PA)J21-
By Equation (82)，we have: 
， > 0 if and only if | J | > 0, 
OPB 
， < 0 if and only if | J | < 0. 
dPs 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive if and only 
if I J | > 0. The own price effect of Good B is negative if and only if 
| J | < 0. 
15. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, <>^21, J22) = (-, +)• 
If (Jii , J12, J21J22) = (—，-’ +’ +)，then I J | may be positive or negative 
(|J| 狄 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 a n d U'(YB - PA)\JN + J12I > AY�— PA)(^21 + J22), 
(b) \J\ < 0 and u'ivb — + M < u'{ya - Pa)(^21 + J22Y 
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if either of the following holds: 
( a ) \J\ > 0 a n d U'{YB - J i i + J12I < AYA — PA){J2I + ^22) , 
(b) I J | < 0 and u'ivb - P a V u + ^12! > u'{ya — PA)(^21 + ^22). 
By Equation (82), we have: 
^ > O i f and only if | J | > 0， 
dPs 
fir)* 
^ < O i f and only if | J | < 0. 
O P B 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive if and only 
if \J\ > 0. The own price effect of Good B is negative if and only if 
\J\ < 0 . 
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16. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, J n , J22) = (—, +’ —, +)• 
If ( J n , J12, J21, J22) = (_’ +’ _’ +)’ then \ J\ may be positive or negative 
By Equation (81), dn \ /dPA > 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is positive) if either of the following holds: 
(a) | J | > 0 and u,[yb - PA) I Ju l + A y a - Pa)\J2i\ > u'{yt - Pa)Ji2 + 
u'iVa - Pa)J22, 
(b) | J | < 0 and u'ivi, — FA) k i l l + Ay a — Pa)\J2i\ < u\yi, - Pa)Ji2 + 
u'{ya - PA)J22-
By Equation (81), dn*JdPA < 0 (i.e. the own price effect of Good A 
is negative) if either of the following holds: 
( a ) \J\ > 0 a n d U'{YB — PA)\JU\ + Ay a — PA)\J2I\ < Ayb - PA)JI2 + 
u'iVa - Pa)J22^ 
(b) | J | < 0 and u'ivb - PA)|Jill + u'{ya - PA)|J21I > u'iyu - Pa)Ji2-^ 
u'iVa - Pa)J22-
By Equation (82), we have: 
� 0 if and only i f \ J \ > 0, 
OPB 
^ < O i f and only if 丨 J | < 0. 
OPB 
This means that the own price effect of Good B is positive if and only 
if J > 0 . The own price effect of Good B is negative if and only if 
| J | < 0 . 
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3.5.8 Details for cross price effects 
The detailed conditions for the signs of the cross price effect for the sixteen 
cases: 
1. Consider the case: (Jn，Ji2"2i’ "^22) = (+，+，+，+). 
If (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (+，+，+’ +)’ then\J\ may be positive or negative 
(丨 J | � 0 ) . 
By Equation (83), we have: 
， < 0 if and only if | J | < 0, 
dPs 
Plri* 
， 〉 0 if and only if |J | > 0. 
O P B 
This means that Good A is a complement for Good B if and only if 
IJ| < 0. Good A is a substitute for Good B if and only if \J\ > 0. 
By Equation (84), we have: 
� < 0 if and only if\J\ < 0, 
OPA 
^ >Oif and only if 丨 J | > 0. 
OPA 
This means that Good B is a complement for Good A if and only if 
I J | < 0 . Good B is a substitute for Good A if and only if \ J\ > 0. 
2. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = ( - , " ) • 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (—,—’ —，-), then |J | may be positive or negative 
By Equation (83)，we have: 
pir,* 
and only if 丨 J | > 0, 
O P B 
^ > O i f and only if 丨 J | < 0. 
O P B 
This means that Good A is a complement for Good B if and only if 
I J | � 0 . Good A is a substitute for Good B if and only if \J\ < 0. 
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By Equation (84), we have: 
， < 0 if and only if |J | > 0, 
O P A 
， 〉 0 if and only if | J | < 0. 
O P A 
This means that Good B is a complement for Good A if and only if 
\J\ > 0. Good B is a substitute for Good A if and only if \ J\ < 0. 
3. Consider the case: (Jn, </i2’ <^ 21，�/22) = (+,+，+，—). 
If ( J n , J12, J21, J22) 二 (+’ +，+, —)’ t h e n \ J \ < 0. 
By Equation (83), we have: 
dPB 
This means that Good A is a complement for Good B. 
By Equation (84)，we have: 
dPA 
This means that Good B is a complement for Good A. 
4. Consider the case: (Jn , J12, J21, J22) == (+，+，_’+). 
If (Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+, +, - ’ +)’ then \J\ > 0. 
By Equation (83), we have: 
dn*A _ 
> 0. 
O P B 
This means that Good A is a substitute for Good B. 
By Equation (84), dn%/dPA < 0 (i.e. Good B is a complement for 
Good A) if and only if 
u'{ya-PA)\J2i\>u'{yb-PA)Jn-
By Equation (84), dn^e/dPA > 0 (i.e. Good B is a substitute for Good 
A) if and only if 
u'iva - PA)\J2I\ < u'ivb — PA)in. 
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5. Consider the case: (Jn, Ju, J21, J22) = (+，—，+，+). 
If (Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+’ - ’ +’ +), then |J | > 0. 
By Equation (83), d n \ l d P s < 0 (i.e. Good A is a complement for 
Good B) if and only if 
丨如丨> ^ 11-
By Equation (83), d r f JdPB > 0 (i.e. Good A is a substitute for Good 
B) if and only if 
\Ji2\ < Jn-
By Equation (84), we have: 
s > � . 
This means that Good B is a substitute for Good A. 
6. Consider the case: (Jn, J12’ >/2i"22) = (—，+，+,+)• 
If (Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (-, +，+, +), then | J | < 0. 
By Equation (83), dn*JdPB < 0 (i.e. Good A is a complement for 
Good B) if and only if 
iJiil < Jn-
By Equation (83), dn*JdPB > 0 (i.e. Good A is a substitute for Good 
B) if and only if 
|Jll | > 1^2-
By Equation (84), dn^/dPA < 0 (i.e. Good B is a complement for 
Good A) if and only if 
u'{ya-PA)J2i>u'{yb-PA)\Ju\-
By Equation (84), dn*B/dPA > 0 (i.e. Good B is a substitute for Good 
A) if and only if 
u'iya — PA)J2I < u'ivb -
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7. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (+’ — ’ —，—). • 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+，—, - ) , then \J\ < 0. 
By Equation (83), d r f JdPB < 0 (i.e. Good A is a complement for 
Good B) if and only if 
J\i > J 12 . 
By Equation (83), dn*JdPB > 0 (i.e. Good A is a substitute for Good 
B) if and only if 
Jn < IM-
By Equation (84), dn%/dPA < 0 (i.e. Good B is a complement for 
Good A) if and only if 
u'{yb-PA)Jn>u'{ya-PA)\J2il 
By Equation (84)，dn*B/dPA > 0 (i.e. Good B is a substitute for Good 
A) if and only if 
Ayb - PA)^11 < u'iva — PA)\J2II 
8. Consider the case: (Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (—, +, —’ -)• 
If (Jii, J12, J21, J22) = ( - , +, — ’ - ) ’ then I J | > 0. 
By Equation (83), dn*JdPB < 0 (i.e. Good A is a complement for 
Good B) if and only if 
Jul > Jl2-
By Equation (83), dn*JdPB > 0 (i.e. Good A is a substitute for Good 
B) if and only if 
丨Jill < Jl2-
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By Equation (84), we have: 
S < � . 
This means that Good B is a complement for Good A. 
9. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (_，一, +,—). 
If (Jn , J12, J21, J22) = ( - ’ - ’ +，—)，then\J\ > 0. 
By Equation (83), we have: 
dn*A ^ 
~ - < 0 
OPB 
This means that Good A is a complement for Good B. 
By Equation (84), dn%ldPA < 0 (i.e. Good B is a complement for 
Good A) if and only if 
AYB — PA) I JILL > U'IVA - PA)J21-
By Equation (84), 3x1%/OPa > 0 (i.e. Good B is a substitute for Good 
A) if and only if 
u\yb-PA)\Jii\<'^{ya-PA)J2i-
10. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = ( 一 ， ― ’ +). 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) == (-’ —，-’ +)，then\J\ < 0. 
By Equation (83), we have: 
dn*A ^ 
This means that Good A is a substitute for Good B. 
By Equation (84)，we have: 
禁〉 0 . 
dPA 
This means that Good B is a substitute for Good A. 
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11. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (+’ +’—’—）• 
If (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (+’ +’ - , —), then \ J \ may be positive or negative 
By Equation (83)，we have: 
， < 0 if and only if | J 丨 < 0’ 
OPB 
^ > O i f and only if | J | > 0. 
OPB 
This means that Good A is a complement for Good B if and only if 
| J | < 0 . Good A is a substitute for Good B if and only if \ J\ > 0. 
By Equation (84), dn^s/dPA < 0 (i.e. Good B is a complement for 
Good A) if either of the following holds: 
( a ) I J | > 0 a n d U'{YA - PA)\J2I\ > U'(YB — PA)JIU 
(b) \J\ < 0 and u'iya — PA)I^211 < U'{YB - PA)Jn. 
By Equation (84), dns/dPA > 0 (i.e. Good B is a substitute for Good 
A) if either of the following holds: 
(a) IJ| > 0 and u'{ya - Pa)\J2i\ < AVb — Pa)Jiu 
(b) I J | < 0 and u'iya — Pa)\J2i\ > u'{yb — P A V I I . 
12. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12’ J21, J22) = (+，-, +，_). 
If (Jii, J12, J21, J22) = (+, +’ 一)’ then \ J \ may be positive or negative 
( j J l ^ O ) . 
By Equation (83)，dn*JdPB < 0 (i.e. Good A is a complement for 
Good B) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 and IJ12I > JN, 
(b) \J\ < 0 and jJ12丨 < Jn-
By Equation (83), d r f J d P B > 0 (i.e. Good A is a substitute for Good 
B) if either of the following holds: 
(a) I J | > 0 and |Ji2丨 < i n , 
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(b) I J | < 0 and | J12丨 > Jn-
By Equation (84), we have: 
^ < 0 if and only if | J | < 0， 
O P A 
piri* � 0 if and only if | J | > 0. 
dPA 
This means that Good B is a complement for Good A if and only if 
I J | < 0 . Good B is a substitute for Good A if and only if \ J\ > 0. 
13. Consider the case: (Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+,_’—，+). 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (+，一’ —，+), then | J | may be positive or negative 
( | J U O ) . 
By Equation (83), dn*JdPB < 0 (i.e. Good A is a complement for 
Good B) if either of the following holds: 
(a) I J | > 0 and | J12I > Jn , 
(b) | J | < 0 and |J12I < Jn-
By Equation (83)，drfJdPB > 0 (i.e. Good A is a substitute for Good 
B) if either of the following holds: 
(a)丨 J | > 0 and | Jisl < Jii, 
(b) | J | < 0 and IJ12I > Jn-
By Equation (84)，dn%/dPA < 0 (i.e. Good B is a complement for 
Good A) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 and u'{ya — > AVb — Pa)Jiu 
(b) IJ| < 0 and u'iva 一 Pa) 1^ 211 < AVb — PA)Jn-
By Equation (84)，dn%/dPA > 0 (i.e. Good B is a substitute for Good 
A) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 a n d u'{ya — PA) 1^211 < AVb _ PA)JU： 
(b) I J | < 0 and u'{ya 一 PA) 1)211 > 
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14. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (—，+, +，—). 
If (Jn, J12, J21, J22) = (_’+ , +’ —)，then | J | may be positive or negative 
By Equation (83)，dn*JdPB < 0 (i.e. Good A is a complement for 
Good B) if either of the following holds: 
(a) I…> 0 and J12 < |Jii|, 
(b) |J | < 0 and J12 > |Jii|. 
By Equation (83), dn*JdPB > 0 (i.e. Good A is a substitute for Good 
B) if either of the following holds: 
(a) | J | > 0 and J12 > |Jii|, 
(b) I J| < 0 and J12 < I Jill. 
By Equation (84), dn%ldPA < 0 (i.e. Good B is a complement for 
Good A) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 and u'{yb - PA) I i n I > AVa — Pa)J2i, 
(b) \J\ < 0 and u'ivb — PA)\JN\ < Ay a — P A ) J21. 
By Equation (84), dn^/dPA > 0 (i.e. Good B is a substitute for Good 
A) if either of the following holds: 
( a ) I J | > 0 a n d v!{yh — P A ) | J I I | < A y a — P A )^21 , 
(b) |J | < 0 and u'ivb - PA) I Jul > AVa _ PA) J21. 
15. Consider the case: (Jn, J12, >>^21, J22) = (-，_，+’+). 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (—, +, +)，then |J | may be positive or negative 
( | J | � 0 ) . 
By Equation (83), we have: 
^ < O i f and only if | J | > 0, 
OPB 
^ >Oif and only if | < 0. 
OPB 
This means that Good A is a complement for Good B if and only if 
\J\ > 0. Good A is a substitute for Good B if and only i f \ J \ < 0. 
121 
By Equation (84), 811%/OPa < 0 (i.e. Good B is a complement for 
Good A) if either of the following holds: 
(a) | J | > 0 and u'iyt - PA) I ^ 111 > Ay a — PA) ^ 21, 
(b) \J\ < 0 and u'ivb - Pa)I^111 < AVA — Pa)J2i-
By Equation (84)，dn%/dPA > 0 (i.e. Good B is a substitute for Good 
A) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 and u'iyt — PA)\Jn\ < AVA _ Pa)J2u 
(b) I J | < 0 and u'iyb — PA)\Jn\ > u'(ya - PA)^21. 
16. Consider the case: ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (_，+，_，+). 
If ( Jn , J12, J21, J22) = (—’ + , 一，+)’ t h e n \ J \ may be positive or negative 
(丨 
By Equation (83), dn*JdPB < 0 (i.e. Good A is a complement for 
Good B) if either of the following holds: 
(a) | J | > 0 and |Ji i | > J12, 
(b) I J | < 0 and |Ji i | < J12. 
By Equation (83)，dn*JdPB > 0 (i.e. Good A is a substitute for Good 
B) if either of the following holds: 
(a) \J\ > 0 and |Ji i | < J12, 
(b) \J\ < 0 and 丨Jn丨 > JN-
By Equation (84), we have: 
^ < O i f and only i f \ J \ > 0, 
OPA 
^ > O i f and only if | J | < 0. 
dPA 
This means that Good B is a complement for Good A if and only if 
IJ| > 0. Good B is a substitute for Good A if and only i f \ J \ < 0. 
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4 Summary of the investigative research 
In this research, we study upward sloping demand using two different ap-
proaches: 
1. Intergroup externality 
2. Signalling value 
The first paper investigates upward sloping demand curve under intergroup 
externalities and proves that all piecewise linear market demand functions 
can be rationalized by piecewise linear downward sloping groups' demands 
with intergroup externalities. 
The second paper makes use of signalling value in a two conspicuous goods 
context and derives the conditions for an upward sloping demand curve. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for signalling values to be generated by a 
rank utility function are provided. Finally, there is a welfare analysis on the 
prohibition of conspicuous goods. 
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